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Editor's Preface
This monograph is timely for the membership of NARST. As science
educators probe teaching and learning in an endeavor to make sense of learning
in classrooms, there is a need for theoretical frameworks to enable new
questions to be posed and a correspondingly fresh set of responses to be
obtained. World view is a framework that can be applied to research on
teaching and learning science and fits well with the trend towards studies that
are interpretive in nature. The number of science education researchers using
ethnographic techniques in science education research is increasing steadily and
theories and methods that emanate from cultural anthropology are appropriate
tools in efforts to unravel the social structure of science classrooms.
Cobern's review is a scholarly treatment which highlights many issues
in science education that have been taken for granted. In an important sense
Cobern has initiated a much needed debate that should stimulate the thinking of
the science education research community. For example, Cobern's world view
raises questions about alternative frameworks and conceptual change, arguably
one of the most researched areas in science education in recent years.
Epistemological issues are also considered in a thoughtful manner, and the world
view framework provides those who have been involved with research on
metaphors and beliefs a framework in which to consider and expand their work.
William Cobern is to be commended for his efforts to produce the third
NARST monograph. Unlike the first two monographs, the concept of world
view will be new to many NARST members, and as a consequence, should be
essential reading for those with long histories in conducting research on science
teaching and learning and for neophytes embarking on their first study in science
education. Evidence of the impact of this monograph will be an increasing
number of studies that utilize world view as an interpretive framework for their
studies of science teaching and learning.
Kenneth Tobin
Chair, Publications Committee
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
I had the privilege of teaching at the University of Sokoto, Nigeria,
from 1979 to 1983. In my science education courses I routinely presented my
students with a moral dilemma, one that I continue to use with my American
students. I asked them to imagine the following scenario:
You are out on a lake in a boat with a spouse, a parent, and
young son or daughter. Of the four in the boat you are the
only one who can swim and the boat has no life preservers.
Suddenly the weather turns bad. The boat flounders and all
are cast into the water. You quickly realize that with the
distance to shore you have hope of saving only one of your
passengers, your spouse, your parent, or your child. Which
one will you save?
It is a difficult decision but most of my Nigerian students came to the same
answer. They would save the parent. And my American students? They too
generally agreed on one answer, but it was to save the child. What is
interesting is the utter astonishment each group feels at hearing the other
group's response.
My what different ways we have of seeing the world!
.ri/^ _ r,K
The Assumptions of Misconception Research
Some of the most interesting work currently being done in science
education research is with what at. first glance appears to be scientifically
misconceived ideas about the causes and mechanisms of natural phenomena.
This research which is related to a larger body of research on students'
conceptual understanding (Pines & West, 1986), has come to be known more
simply as misconception research. There are, however, numerous other terms
used to denote basically the same phenomenon, e.g., primitive science, naive
theories, alternative frameworks (Gauld, 1987). This type of research can be
dated as early as the sixties (see Kuethe, 1963; Boyd, 1966); but it came into
its own with the 1983 and 1987 international symposia on misconception
research in science and mathematics education held at Cornell University
(Helm & Novak; Novak). Researchers have demonstrated that students do not
come into the science classroom with minds tabula rasa. Students bring to
class ideas and values about the natural world that they have formulated based
on their own socio-cultural environment including previous educational
experiences (Hawkins, 1985; Morrison, 1985; Gunstone, 1988). As science,
some of these ideas are simply incorrect, others are quite close if not
essentially correct. Some students come into class already holding a high
view of science, i.e., they like science and they think it is important. Others
come with value and belief systems that will readily incorporate a high view
of science given the proper circumstances. Others are prepared to resist. The
objective of misconception research is,
to enable us to learn more about the content of the beliefs
and ideas students bring to formal instruction in the sciences.
The rationale lying behind much of this work is that by
coming to better understand these views we will gain more
insight into certain intellectual difficulties students encounter
in the course of their efforts to learn science. (Hills 1989,
p. 156)
In recent years science educators have studied the content of student
ideas concerning many physical phenomena - a veritable cottage industry as
Susan Carey (1986) has commented. To date misconception research,
particularly in the United States, has largely been limited to elucidating
misconceptions in various science subject areas. Even where more emphasis
has been placed on understanding the student's point of view (e.g., UK and
Australia) the research still culminates with suggestions for developing
instructional strategies for replacing misconceptions with accurate scientific
understanding. As G.L.C. Hills states, the researchers generally believe "that
youngsters' untutored frameworks and methods stand in need of repair or
replacement" (1989, p. 182). Regardless of the wisdom of this focus, the
2
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significance of misconception research is the attention given to the
epistemology of students, whether they are young adults or children. This is
in marked contrast to Piagetian researchers in science education who, to
paraphrase Gareth B. Matthews, do not take children's puzzlings senously
(1980, p.48).
As in any avenue of research, misconception research involves
assumptions. Hills in his recent critique of misconception research has
unpacked some of these. He found that the research is,
informed by the assumption that pupils' untutored ideas are
scientific, if only in some embryonic sense...much of this
research seems to have taken it for granted that pupils' ideas
can be understood as some form of primitive or unsophis
ticated science. (1989, p. 157)
The research assumes science to be the "proper yardstick for assessing" student
views (1989, p.161). Furthermore, it can be inferred from the corpus of
misconception research that often an assumption of homogeneity among
students is made, even when there is gender, racial, and cultural diversity
among students. Specifically, researchers assume that students come into
elementary, secondary and college science classes with relatively homogeneous,
fundamental views of the natural world capable of assimilating and valuing
modern scientific understanding when science knowledge is presented in proper
enquiry fashion. When a misconception is encountered researchers seek an
exact identification of the misconception, and methods for supplanting it with
accurate scientific understanding. Why? In Hills' colorful phrasing, to save
the students from "the clutches of a misconception," that is, any view that
"parts company with the currently accepted scientific view" (1989, p.161).
The researchers do not ask:
Is it possible that this scientifically misconceived idea is a
logical deduction from some fundamental view of nature held
by the student?
This question would indicate that researchers suspect more to be at issue than
factors of pedagogy and student intelligence. Moreover, once this question is
entertained one must reconsider the wisdom of misconception research
assumptions.
CHAPTER 1
ACM: The Alternative Conceptions Movement
In the general field of misconception research there are researchers
interested in students' epistemological structures per se} Gilbert and Swift
(1985, p.682) note that "an emerging 'invisible college' for what we have
termed the 'alternative conceptions movement' (ACM) appears to be gradually
emerging." According to Osborne and Wittrock:
over the last few years there has been a growing awareness
among science educators of the importance, for learning, of
the conceptions that children of all ages bring with them to
science lessons. (1983, p.489)
An important premise in ACM research and something that separates it from
other misconception research is the premise that children's ideas,
arc not simply isolated ideas...but rather they are part of
conceptual structures which provide a coherent and sensible
understanding of the world from the child's point of view.
(Gilbert et al., 1982, p.623)
While applauding the shift away from isolated views labeled misconceptions
and toward the recognition that children hold integrated views representing
reality, Hills argued that the ACM researchers nevertheless continue the
misconception assumption that the student's view is to be judged as a
scientific view. For example, though Osborne and Wittrock (1983, p.489)
wrote:
a most important feature of these studies is the attempt to
establish the views children hold whether or not these views
are congruent with those of scientists,
the underlying assumption is that the student views are eventually to be judged
on scientific grounds. Those views found wanting are deemed in need of
change. The assumptions suggest things about the researchers' own world
views and indeed opens them to the charge of scientism. The line between
science and scientism is crossed when one insists that validity of student views
or ideas must be solely determined on scientific grounds, as if to say there are
no other legitimate grounds for assessing validity. Quite the contrary, student
views,
'See for examples. Driver, Guesne & Tiberghein (1985); Driver & Easley (1978); Fensham
(1980); Freyberg & Osborne (1981).
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provide a different sectioning of experience precisely because
the pursuit of scientific knowledge is not the only or even the
most important goal they subserve. (Hills & McAndrews,
1987, p.216)
From the beginning of misconception research there have been those
uncomfortable with the term misconception, seeing it as emotive and pejorative.
Some of the early researchers such as Champagne, Gunstone and Klopfer
(1983, 1985) had moved away from the term by the mid eighties. One
unintended result has been the proliferation of replacement terms. Abimbola
(1988) has recently made a case for eliminating all of the various terms and
settling with alternative conception. The difficulty with this position is that any
use of the adjective alternative implies an either/or situation which is neither
necessary nor prudent. Gunstone (1989), in response to Abimbola, argued that
it is not possible to settle on a single term appropriate for all studies in this
field. He cited the anomalous groupings of papers at the 1988 annual meeting
of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching (Blosser &
Helgeson) that resulted from lumping all misconception studies. Though
Gunstone's position has its appeal, Hills' term untutored beliefs is to be
preferred in most situations. This term carries no epistemological nor
evaluative baggage. It simply refers to the beliefs that students acquire in
their everyday experience, not as a result of formal schooling. One may also
agree with Gunstone that there are other occasions when the term
misconception is the more appropriate.2
Commonsense Theory and World View
Commonsense Theory
Hills' paper on student untutored beliefs is a welcome addition to the
research literature because he so clearly identified these crucial assumptions in
misconception and ACM research. He dismissed them and argued that many
of the student views now labeled as misconceptions can be better understood
as untutored beliefs. Hills uses the term untutored as a nonpejorative desig
nation for a person's understanding of the world as gained from everyday
experience in a cultural context (which may include formal instruction
mediated by family or religion), as opposed to views gained through formal
school instruction. These untutored beliefs are not part of an alternative
framework, but of a commonsense theory:
2See Chapter 6, Figure #14, p.95.
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it seems evident that children come to school already
equipped with a more or less sophisticated understanding of
how the world works...commonsense, then is the range of
concepts, beliefs and values that people share which provide
a basic view of the world, of their position in the world and
of how they ought to act...it is more properly viewed as a
system of shared beliefs or concepts which provides the basis
for day-to-day activities within a culture. (Hills, 1989, p.169)3
The notion of commonsense theory originated with David Hawkins (1978) and
was further developed by Hills and McAndrews (1987). Commonsense
theories have been studied in various cultural situations (e.g., Hewson, 1985;
George, 1986,1988) and indeed one would expect to find them among all
people,
the existence of the commonsense scheme (or schemes) is
crucial, for on it depends the very possibility of communi
cation and other forms of social relations. Of course, none of
this is meant to suggest that commonsense is everywhere the
same. (Hills, 1989, p. 170)
One can thus distinguish two basic views of student untutored beliefs. There
is a low view associated with the misconception and alternative conception
movements, and a high view associated with the commonsense movement.
This difference in view point is reminiscent of differences in
anthropology sixty years ago provoked by the 1926 publication of Lucien
Levy-Bruhl's How Natives Think, in which he argued that the thinking of
primitive peoples is prelogical and mystical. This was an inference drawn by
comparing the cultures of nonmodern peoples with the cultures of modern
peoples and evaluating the nonmodern peoples on modern terms. In contrast,
Evans-Pritchard (1929), Max Gluckman (1944) and Robin Horton (1967),
among others, have argued that traditional thinking is eminently logical, given
the context in which it operates. They remind one of Boas' earlier conclusion,
the traditional and customary beliefs of a society provide no
evidence about the way individuals think. Beliefs that an
outsiderconsiders bizarre are not evidence of bizarre thinking.
They tell us something about the social tradition...about pat-
'For other work on commonsense theories see Bliss (1989); Bliss &Ogborn (1988); George
(1986 & 88); Viega (1988). For a related research avenue see Marton (1988) on
phenomenography.
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tems of thought, which are a social product, (reported by
Musgrove, 1982, p.70)
In like fashion, student untutored beliefs are socio-culturally influenced
constructions critical to personal meaning and socio-cultural interaction on a
daily basis.'' Given this understanding of a person's untutored view of the
world it becomes inappropriate for science educators to see these views as
misconceptions.
World View
Difficulties for the science educator occur when student commonsense
theories appear to compete with the scientific understanding that the teacher
has as his or her instructional objective. Science educators wish to understand
the nature of this competition and why it is that the scientific understanding
so often competes poorly. This requires an investigation of the foundational
beliefs, i.e., presupposition,5 about the world that support both commonsense
and scientific theories - that is world view.
The theoretical work reported in this monograph differs from current
interests in misconception and ACM research in that its focus is the
epistemological levels antecedent to the specific views that students hold about
physical phenomena, whether one calls those views commonsense theories,
alternative frameworks, misconceptions, or valid science. From this theoretical
point of view, each person can be seen as having a fundamental, epistemo
logical macrostructure which forms the basis for his or her view of reality.
The more common term is world view. Commonsense theories and scientific
theories are different ways in which one makes sense of the world.6 Both
ways, however, rest on the fundamental assumptions (presuppositions) of one's
world view. Tliis relationship is illustrated with the use of Gowin's Knowledge
Wee (1981) in Figure #1. It is not necessary, however, to view commonsense
and scientific theory as being mutually exclusive alternatives as the Vee might
suggest. It is more appropriate to see,
"Socio-cultural is used as an inclusive term representing both social interaction and the
environment of meaning and symbols in which social interaction takes place (See Geertz, 1973).
'For a more complete discussion of belief and presupposition see Chapter 3, pp.40&41. The
terminology of assumption and presupposition is discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 18-20.
*For an excellent account of the difference between commonsense and science theories, see
Hills & McAndrews (1987). n
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scientific theories and commonsense theories as being two
distinctive but overlapping frameworks and as involved in
activities animated by distinctive but overlapping purposes
(Hills, 1989, p.181)7
CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN
World Vl8Yf
Theory
(Scientific or
Commonsense)
Science Concepts
or UntutorBd
Beliefs
FACTUAL DOMAIN
Knowledge Claims
Facts
Events
Fig. 1. Gowin's Knowledge Vee: Science and Commonsense
Figure #2 is an attempt to illustrate the probable relationship between scientific
and commonsense theory within the context of world view. Both types of
theory are made possible by world view presuppositions. It is likely that some
of these presuppositions are shared while others are not. The spheres
'According to Wolters (1989) the best English term for the German Weltanschauung is
worldview as a single word. However, in American dictionanes world view is always two
words. That is how it most often appears in the scholarly literature and how it appears in this
monograph. Related concepts for world view that occasionally appear m the education literature
are root metaphor, world hypothesis, view of nature, view of reality, and perceptual framework.
Often these concepts are incorrectly used as synonyms for world view.
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representing the theory level overlap to indicate that (in all likelihood) there
are elements in common. The double pointed arrows indicate that influence
is probably bidirectional. Finally, scientific theory is shown further removed
from world view since it is not a result of inculturation, but of formal
instruction. Of course, world views develop, evolve and change. Thus,
experiences such as formal science instruction have the potential for
influencing world view. As stated above, Figure #2 is a suggestion of how
things are likely to be. Understanding the articulation of world view,
commonsense, and scientific theory will only come with considerable research.
Fig. 2. Science Theory, Commonsense Theory, & World View
In a 1983 publication, Hawkins wrote about a deep barrier phenomena
in learning. In doing so he touched at the heart of world view theory,
presuppositions:
:hapter i
The textbook says that heat flows from hot to cold, or that
light travels in straight lines, or that the earth goes about the
sun; the teacher tries to elucidate... But failure is often
imminent. In each case, the intended communication is
blocked, more often than not, by a radical mismatch between
the presuppositions of the book or the teacher and those of
the child. What the book and the teacher obedient to it try
to communicate often presupposes (but fails to induce) a
radical reorganization, in each case, of some commonsense
category of experience. If our early grasp of motion is itself
all geographical, then the earth itself surely does not go.
(p.75)
To date science education research has focused on the sphere of scientific
theory, which includes theory considered to be prescicntific, misconceived
scientific, and alternatives to scientific theory. In a discussion of barriers to
scientific ideas and attitudes, barriers such as those described above, Hawkins
wrote:
reasonably patient explanation is no cure...we are up against
something rather deep in the relation between science and
common sense; we are up against a barrier to teaching in the
didactic mode which has hardly been recognized, or if
recognized has been seen mainly as a challenge to ingenuity
in teaching rather than as a challenge to a deeper understand
ing of human learning...(1978, pp.5&7; emphases added)
Twelve years later the situation is much the same. The concerns of education
are for the most part with the "domestic affairs" of science and not "foreign
relations," to use Hills' apt phrasing (1989, p.183).8
The study of foreign relations requires a concept such as world view.
World view research means seeking to know more about students'
presuppositions about the world, their epistemological macrostructures. It is a
logical extension of current research avenues although some may see world
view as an issue only in conjunction with gender and culture. This tendency
to assume general homogeneity amongst students, however, may be the very
assumption that keeps researchers from a more comprehensive understanding
There are important exceptions. Millar (1989) is a good example of a collection of articles
that "explores the areas of common interest between science education and science studies" (pi),
where science studies refers to the social study of science and science education.
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of factors that lead to science achievement and positive science attitudes and
interest Furthermore, world view theory should help provide the needed
theoretical framework for continued commonsense theory research on a
nonpejorative footing, as well as for essential research regarding gender and
cultural factors in science education.
A critical hindrance to world view research has been the wont of a
theory of world view that can direct analysis. The purpose of this monograph
is to discuss an adaptation of the Kearney logico-structural model of world
view as a theoretical framework for directing science education research with
regard to student untutored beliefs, students' scientific understanding, and the
development of science interest and attitude. Kearney's theory and the
supporting evidence is the subject of his book, World View (1984). The book
reviews a broad range of cultural, ethnophilosophical and world view studies
in the literature of cultural anthropology, including Kearney's own research.
From this review he identified common categories to form his theoretical
model.' The very fact that Kearney's theoretical work is based on empirical
anthropological research rather than on more speculative philosophical analysis
gives it a credibility lacking in other approaches to world view (e.g., Pepper,
1942). Of course Kearney is not without his critics. Interested readers should
consult reviews by Brown (1984), Dundes (1984), and Wilk (1985).
M.F.D. Young made an observation that is, in fact, one of the crucial
reasons for raising the issue of world view in science education:
school science separates science from pupils' everyday lives,
and in particular their non-school knowledge of the natural
world. It is learnt primarily as a laboratory activity, in a
room full of special rules, many of which have no real
necessity except in terms of the social organization of the
school. (1976, p.53)
If science educators can come to a better understanding of how people view
the world and why, perhaps the structure of science education can be changed
so that Young's separation is closed.
*For a discussion of the method of grounded theory in ethnography, see Hutchinson (1988).
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Critical Assumptions and Terminology
Philosophical Assumptions
The study of world view is itself influenced by the world view of the
researcher, as the controversial work of Margaret Mead so graphically
illustrates.10 Knowing this to be true Kearney begins his account of logico-
structuralism by openly declaring that his own world view is significantly
informed by Marxist materialism. This influence is indeed seen in his writing,
though readers will not find his world view model to be inherently Marxist.
This is not surprising for several reasons. To begin with, world view is a
totality concept referring to one's total oudook on reality. Marxism quite
specifically is a political philosophy that can become resident in very different
world views.11 Kearney is a Westerner and naturally shares in much of the
Western, non-Marxist tradition. In fact, his own book openly shows the
considerable influence of the non-Marxist, Western anthropologist, Robert
Redfield. Thus, without difficulty, one may reject the Marxist-materialist
tenets in Kearney's writings, and accept his world view model as a grounded
theory based on research in cultural anthropology. As to his Marxist
philosophy, one may suspect that Kearney's Marxism is more important to his
doing of ethnography, such as on his choice of subjects and specific research
questions.
The motivating philosophy in this monograph is critical realism. This
view posits ontologically real touchstones (e.g., the earth, humanity, God).
World views are constructed out of the need to make sense of these
touchstones. The dynamics of environment - human, social, philosophical,
economic, physical, etc. - result in world view variations (see Figure 3, p.23).
Those variations, however, are finite, being circumscribed by the touchstones
of ontological reality. Whether this monograph would have been significantly
different had it been written by a radical constructivist for example, is
debatable. From either philosophical stance, the researcher will use world
view theory in the study of student cognitive culture, science classroom
culuire, and the interaction of the two. As with Kearney's Marxism,
differences surface at other levels. In science education, critical realists and
"See page 59, footnote #14. For a second example of controversy, see Jones (1972).
"The relationship of philosophy to world view it discussed in Chapter 2, pp.18-20.
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radical contructivists are more likely to part company over matters of
curriculum and policy.12
Pedagogical Assumptions
Most would grant that in ethnically diverse classrooms a prima facie
case can be made for world view variations as a factor in die education
process. The principal, pedagogical assumptions of this monograph are that
the students have subtle, world view variations; that these world view
variations support valid views or theories about the world that may or may not
be scientifically oriented; and that these variations constitute an important
factor in science achievement and attitude development among students. This
monograph differs from much of the literature in science education research
in that, studies in anthropology are incorporated as research just as important
to science education as studies in the history and philosophy of science.
And finally, the more general term science education is used rather
than the more specific term science achievement. This is based on the position
that attitude and interest have cognitive roots, and thus are shaped by world
view presuppositions. The term science education incorporates achievement,
interest and attitude. At this early point in die development of world view
research in science education it is advisable that one use the more specific
terms carefully.
"For further discussion of radical constructivism ami critical realism, see Chapter 2, pp. 25
29.
CHAPTER
World View by Definition...
According to Webster the definition of world view is
Weltanschauung, but then the real world is seldomly as simple
as a dictionary definition.
Lebenswelt, Weltbild, and Weltanschauung
The English word worldview is a claque on the German word
Weltanschauung.* The first pubhshed appearance of Weltanschauung is in
Kant's Critique of Judgement, 1790, and one may assume that he coined the
term. Kant quite simply used it as a reference to one's sense perception of
the world round about. One of Kant's students, Johann Fichte (1762-1814),
brought the term from Konigsberg to Jena where it was adopted by Fichte's
colleague, Friedrick von Schelling (1775-1834). With Fichte and Schelling the
meaning of the term began to change. It no longer referred to simple sense
'For this section on the history of the term Weltanschauung I am very much in the debt
of Prof. Al Wolters of Redeemer College. Canada (see Wolters, 1989).
World View by Definition . . .
perception but to intellectual perception. It referred no longer to how one sees
the world, but to how one understands the world.
Fichte and Schelling were prominent early figures in the German
traditionsof Idealism and Romanticism that dominatedGerman culture through
the 19th Century. Thus, between 1799 and 1814, Weltanschauung appeard
increasingly in the vocabulary of the German speaking literati, including Hegel
and Goethe. By the mid 1800's it could be found in the works of historians,
composers, theologians, and scientists (e.g., Leopold von Ranke, Richard
Wagner, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Alexander von Humbolt respectively). In
the first decade of the 20th Century new books appearred on the
Weltanschauung of Kant, Darwin, Nietzsche, and modern physics, to name only
a few subjects. In 1904, provoked by its widespread popularity in German
speaking culture, Herman Bavinck referred to it as "the slogan of the day"
(quoted in Wolters, 1989, p.3). Claques on the German Weltanschauung
quickly appeared in most other European languages and remain yet prompting
Wolters' comment "it seems that modern Western thought cannot do without
the concept" (p.5).
After the turn of the century the philosophical sense of
Weltanschauung steadied somewhat According to Wolters, Weltanschauung is,
an overall conception of reality and human existence rooted
in the existential experiences of life...(p.6) ...a general concept
of a deeply existential philosophical or religious totality-
view...(p.8) ...a comprehensive view of life and the world
which is the proper goal of philosophy...(pp.23&24)
Later in the 20th Century one finds this totality sense of the term
communicated in science related literature such as Julian Huxley's Evolutionary
Vision and Fritjof Capra's The Turning Point. It is also found in the writings
of Christian philosopher-theologians such as Alvin Plantinga (1984) and Arthur
Holmes (1983). A similar usage, but from quite a different context, can be
found in Soviet Education articles on the development of the communist and
materialist man.2
Dispite the philosophical emphasis of Weltanschauung, there continued
to be related conceptions of world view. Wolters identified three totality-
formations in the work of Harald Hoffding (1843-1931), life-view, world view,
and religion. Life-view or Lebensanschauung is an involuntary, socio-culturally
JAn especially informative article is Ogorodnikov's "Instilling the Communist World View,"
(1980).
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determined view of the world that becomes a world view, Weltanschauung,
when supported by arguments and claiming universal validity. This sense of
world view includes metaphysics and cosmology. World view becomes
religion when it informs ultimate values. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)
expressed a similar tripartite view which is of interest because of its later
association with anthropology. He argued that one has a pretheoretical,
implicit world picture or Weltbild that naturally develops in the context of
one's Lebensweit, i.e., the world in which one lives (Holmes, 1983). Dilthey
further theorized that on the foundation of one's Weltbild, a person
systematically constructs a Weltanschauung to explain the vagaries and
mysteries of life:
the mystery that surrounds the great crises of birth and death,
the round of the seasons and the crops, the endless battle of
human freedom against natural forces and necessities...From
the most primitive societies upward, men busy themselves to
read this riddle...and systematic Weltanschauungen are delibe
rately worked out, where...a full interpretation of the universe
is set forth. (1957, pp.25-27)
Dilthey's work exerted great influence on scholars including Franz
Boas (1858-1942). Boaz immigrated to the United States from Germany
bringing with him the notion of Weltanschauung (Kearney, 1984). However,
Boas steered American anthropology in a different direction. He opposed the
cultural evolutionists of his day who sought an overall theory of cultural
development.3 Instead, he encouraged his own students to undertake the
exhaustive study of individual cultures for the purpose of reconstructing
individual cultural histories. Ruth Benedict is perhaps his most renown
student Her book Patterns of Culture provides one of the earliest and best
American examples of the anthropological study of world view. Benedict's
goal was to construct a society's Weltbild by integrating observed social
behavior into patterns or configurations.4
Boaz is an especially fascinating figure because he was a student of
the natural sciences. He was also interested in the history of cultures though
not a formal discipline at the time. He pursued advanced studies in physics
and geography at Heidelberg and Bonn, and later at Keil he received his
*Though Boaz opposed the determinism of Dilthey, out of a regard for scholarship he
encouraged his students to study Dilthey's theories. See Ketner (1972, p.7) and Mead (1959,
p.211).
4The configuration (or pattern) approach to world view if discussed in the next section.
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doctoral degree. It was while doing research in physics that Boas became
interested in problems related to the processes of inquiry:
After becoming aware of the large subjective factor involved
in his laboratory observations he realized the necessity of
taking into account the situational conditions...This problem
evolved into a broader project concerning the influence of
environmental conditions on perception in general. (Kearney,
1984, p.26)
What is so interesting about Boas is that at the turn of the century he was
intrigued by an issue that is increasingly becoming of interest in the late
1900's, i.e., the impact on science of the socio-culuiral environment5
At this point one should note a distinction between two uses of the
English term world view. There is the more philosophical usage related to the
German Weltanschauung. There is also the sense of world view as a life-
view or world picture, related to the German Weltbild, identified with Boas
school of cultural history. It would help if one could reduce the semantic
confusion associated with world view as Weltbild, the cultural term, and world
view as Weltanschauung, the philosophical term. For this purpose, the
American philosopher John Kok (1988) coined the English terms lived world
view and articulated world view. Lived world view refers to Dilthey's
Weltbild, the meaning of world view as it is generally used in anthropology.
Lived world view conveys the sense that a world view is a communally
shared, epistemological framework essential for daily life. An articulated
world view, quite opposite of a lived world view, is formed in a process that
is "conscious, coherent [and] unambiguous" (Kok, p.20), and is much more
closely related to philosophy, religion, and ideology. Plato's dialogues,
Aristotle's treatises, Calvin's Institutes each sets forth an articulated world
view. Of critical importance to educators is how the facets of a lived world
view are related to articulated world views. Both are important parts of the
cognitive and perceptual framework depicted in Figure #3 (p. 22). In any
given cultural setting, the distinction between the two is often obscured,
provoking endless headaches among scholars. These two aspects of world
view were the cause of heated discussion among anthropologists at the 1968
Wenner-Gren conference on world views. No resolution was reached then, nor
since (Jones, 1972). An elucidation of the dialectical relationship between
these two levels of world view will be an important issue in science education
research, though not a simple one. Of central interest to science educators is
the notion of a scientific world view which in its common usage refers to an
*For further information on the life and work of Franz Boas, see Stocking (1974),
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articulated world view (see AAAS, 1989).6 Many intriguing questions come
quickly to mind. For example, can there be more than one scientific, arti
culated world view based on a scientifically compatible, lived world view?
Defining the Concept of World View
As noted above, the concepts of lived and articulated world view are
frequendy comingled. It is thus no surprise that religions and philosophies are
often seen as world views. For example, people speak of a Christian world
view or an Islamic world view, a constructivist world view, or a realist world
view. Indeed, religion can be a powerful tool used by reflective individuals
for articulating a religiously informed world view. Futhermore, religion is an
especially powerful formative force on the mind of a growing child, greatly
influencing the contours of a child's developing world view. There are
however, many environmental factors that influence children and adults.
Though religion influences world view, religion itself is influenced by world
view. Consider, for example, both the significant differences and similarities
between African and Western Christians, between Arabian and non Arabian
Muslims.
Concerning philosophy the distinction is more clear. Philosophy by
definition is a conscious, self-reflective endeavor. The premises of philosophy
are arrived at through critical thought. Quite the opposite, the assumptions of
world view are implicit, and only by the greatest effort at self-reflection does
one become aware of them. Generally speaking, world view is not a matter
of personal choice.7 Wallace descriptively summarized the relationship of
religion and philosophy with world view:
...a world view is not merely a philosophical by-product of
each culture, like a shadow, but the very skeleton of concrete
cognitive assumptions on which the flesh of customary beha
vior is hung. World view, accordingly, may be expressed,
more or less systematically, in cosmology, philosophy, ethics,
religious ritual, scientific belief, and so on, but it is implicit
in almost every act. (1970, p.143)
Or to paraphrase Hiebert (1976), religion and philosophy are visible
expressions of a world view.
*The concept of a scientific world view is discussed in Chapter 5,
T^or a much more complete analysis of the relationship between world view and philosophy,
see Board (1963) and Ketner (1972).
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World view, as used in anthropology, refers to the
culturally-dependent implicit, fundamental organization of the mind. This
implicit organization is composed of presuppositions or assumptions which
predispose one to feel, think, and act in predictable patterns.8 Kearney refers
to world view as:
...culturally organized macrothought those dynamically
inter-related basic assumptions of a people that determine
much of their behavior and decision making, as well as
organizing much of their body of symbolic creations...and
ethnophilosophy in general. (1984, p.l)
World view undergirds rationality. To be rational means to think and act with
reason, or in other words to have an explanation or justification for thought
and action. Such explanations and justifications ultimately rest upon one's
presuppositions about the world. In other words, a world view inclines one
to a particular way of tliinking. According to Kearney a world view:
...consists of basic assumptions and images that provide a
more or less coherent, though not necessarily accurate, way
of thinking about the world. (1984, p.41)
A world view defines the self. It sets the boundaries of who and what / am.
It also defines everything that is not me, including my relationships to the
human and non-human environments. It shapes one's view of the universe,
one's conception of time and of space. It influences one's norms and values
(Kraft, 1978, p.4).
A world view has five functions. It explains the how and why of
things, and why things continue as they do. It validates "goals, institutions,
and values of a society and provides them with a means for evaluating all
outside influences as well as activities and attitudes within the society" (Kraft,
1974, p.4). A world view reinforces people "at points of anxiety or crisis in
life providing security and support for the behavior of the group" (1974, p.5);
*To this point two terms have been used in reference to the content of a world view,
assumptions and presuppositions. Assumption is Kearney's (1984) preferred term while
presupposition is shortened from Collingwood's (1940) absolute presupposition. Because
it is generally necessary to use the term assumption for other purposes, e.g., research assump
tions in an investigation, it is less confusing to use the term presupposition when referring to
world view content. For the sake of brevity, the adjective absolute has been dropped though
Collingwood's distinction between absolute and relative presuppositions is an important one.
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and both encourages and prescribes behavior. A world view is an integrator.
It allows one to order and systematize sense perception. According to Kraft:
this system makes it possible for a people to conceptualize
what reality should be like and to understand and interpret all
that happens day by day in this framework. (1974, p.5)
Finally, there is an adaptive function. A world view is "resilient and
reconciles differences between the old understandings and the new in order to
maintain a state of equilibrium" (1974, p.5). World view helps one maintain
a sense of mental order and balance in a world of change via the dialectical
interaction between our extant world view presuppositions and environmental
changes.
Cultural anthropologists study world views to learn moreabout people
and their cultures. They want to know why one group acts and thinks this
way, while another group acts and thinks a different way. For educators the
importance of world view is identified in two assumptions:
that the best immediate understanding of behavior is offered
by understanding the thoughts that underlie the behavior,
and...other things being equal, the economy of human thought
and the nature of culture are such that cognitive assumptions
at work in one area of life, say economic production, will
also organize thinking in others, say...ideas about human
nature. (Kearney, 1984, pp.3&4)
In other words, one assumes that thought has a great influence on action; and
furthermore, that even very different areas of thought are influenced by what
might be called generic, cognitive presuppositions. In a discussion of
conceptual change, Carey wrote:
we must find better ways of representing conceptual structures
so as to be able to analyze conceptual reorganization. (1986,
p.l 129, emphasis her's)
Knowing more about students' world views should help researchers come to
a better understanding of conceptual change by providing a more complete
understanding of conceptual structure. It should as well enable educators to
better understand student attitudes and achievement in general.
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The Formation of a World View
The driving force behind the development of a world view is a
person's need to relate to the outside world. As aptiy stated by Ross (1962,
p.x), man's "experience is useless unless interpreted." Beginning in child
hood, each person interacts with his or her physical and social environment,
and through this myriad of environmental interactions, world view
presuppositions are unconsciously constructed. The process occurs over a long
period of time, with the formative, childhood years being of most importance.
Through the years of schooling, formal education contributes to world view
development; and in turn, a world view provides a foundation upon which
cognitive frameworks are built during the learning process.
Ordinary experiences of maturation indicate that at some point of
maturity (e.g., as an adult) the malleableness of a world view begins to
decrease. It becomes resilient in the face of change providing an adult with
cognitive stability. As noted above, world views also have an adaptive
function which allows even adults to adjust to new environments. Thus, while
world view presuppositions are strongly held, they are not immutable. The
strength with which a mature world view is held appears to be inversely
related to the degree of heterogeneity in a culture. The more heterogeneity,
the less strongly a world view is apt to be held. This proposed process of
world view development and change is what Kearney calls "dialectical
constructionism" (1984, p.3). It has a compelling ring to it because it shares
much with Piaget's genetic epistemology (1971) as well as with Ausubel's
constructionist theory of learning (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian, 1978;
Gunstone, 1988). In human mental architecture, world view is the foundation
upon which one constructs cognitive and perceptual frameworks.
Figure #3 is an attempt to illustrate the theoretical relationship that
world view has with cognition, learning, perception and behavior, and
environment Within each block of concepts there are arrows indicating
relationships, e.g., between world view and cognitive frameworks. Between
blocks the clockwise arrows indicate relationships between sets of concepts A,
B, and C. For example, world view directs general behavior. Our general
behavior involves both sampling (or selecting) and modifying our environment,
which in turn stimulates the development modification, and evolution of our
world view. Of course, to this description of world view development one
must append the caveat emptor, "or so it appears," for little is actually known
about such processes. It is reasonable however, to say that world view
development must be a specific kind of the cognitive, conceptual development
typically of interest to science educators.
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Fig. 3. The DialecUcal Development and Evolution of a World View
(adapted from Kearney, 1984, p.45)
Furthermore, with respect to young children, world view development
is probably indistinguishable from other aspects of conceptual development.
World view theory supports those researchers interested in the contexts of
meaning in which children construct knowledge (Bloom, In Press). These
researchers opine:
children ^...understanding of their world is far more complex
than what most research leads us to believe. (Bloom, p.15)
They say that it is not a simple matter of constructing propositions. Rather,
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children's thinking is guided by an ever-changing variety of
knowledge, frameworks of belief, mental processes, and
emotions. (Bloom, 1989)
In the literature anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, and zoomorphism have all
been given as examples of children's frameworks of belief (e.g., Gauld, 1987).
Science educators will likely find that these types of belief in children
adumbrate world view presuppositions to come. In childhood, however, it
would be a mistake to see world view as a distinct conceptual development.
The contexts of meaning research is fairly new. Lev Vygotsky's work
represents an older view of cognitive development, though one enjoying
renewed popularity (Vygotsky, 1962). Vygotsky "outlined a theory of mind
in socio-cultural context" (Wertsch 1988, p.82), arguing that one must consider
socio-cultural history in order to understand cognitive development on the
premise that
uniquely human, mental functioning in an individual has
social origins and a quasi-social nature. (Wertsch, 1988, p.85)
Implicit in Vygotsky's work is the importance of contexts of meaning,
including world view, to learning.9 It is Vygotsky's emphasis on socio-
cultural context that coincides with world view and context of meaning
research; and pulling these three strands together should help educators further
the understanding of childrens' cognitive development
The Social Construction of Knowledge
To some extent these elements are pulled together by Joan Solomon
in her work on the social construction of knowledge (1987, 85, 85b).
Solomon uses a constructivist framework in her research (based on Driver &
Easley, 1978). However, she objects to the personal constructivist position
with it focus "firmly upon personal experience and personal knowledge" (1987,
p.65). Researchers taking a personalist position contend that learning more
and more about student alternative frameworks will enable educators to
develop more effective science instruction strategies. Solomon argues that
empirical studies have not supported this position (e.g., Gilbert & Watts,
1983).
Instead of personal construction, Solomon speaks of the social
construction of knowledge. She views teaching and leaning from a sociology
•For further information regarding Lev Vygotsky see Holowinsky (1987) and Simon (1988).
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of knowledge perspective based on Mead (1934), Berger & Luckmann (1967),
and Schutz & Luckmann (1973). A sociological view of children's
knowledge,
starts out not from the logical processes of which science
boasts, but from the 'common sense' attitude that relies on
being able to interchange perspectives and meanings with
others. (1987, p.66)
The interchange of perspectives and meanings with others that Solomon speaks
of is the socialization process into "life world knowledge" (p.67), a concept
which is very close to, if not synonymous with, world view. Every thing that
a student knows is embedded in life world knowledge. Solomon's crucial
observation is that socialization into life is very different from the socialization
into school science. This perspective has led her to investigations of social
processes in science classrooms and the influence of these processes on the
learning of science (e.g., 1984).
The social processes of interest to Solomon are the shared
conversation of students, student interpersonal communications. Solomon has
noted, however, that there are other types of social influence,
which act more remotely on individuals through the language
they use, through the unspoken expectations of their culture,
or through the information media to which they are exposed.
This cluster of influences is social both in the most obvious
sense of acting through the larger cultural group, and also in
many of the ways in which it operates. (1987, p.73).
As examples she has cited several cross-cultural investigations of specific
science topics (Mori et al., 1976; Duit 1981; Sutton, 1980; Ross & Sutton,
1982), and a review article on informal education (Lucas, 1983). Solomon
concluded her 1987 paper by noting that social influences are both tenacious
and pervasive, and that students are,
strongly social beings for whom the teaching of a rigidly
insulated science which makes no contact with the everyday
context is simply not an option, (p.79)
The concept of social influences in science education which Solomon
has so ably addressed, is critical in world view theory. World view refers to
cognitive macrostructure. It refers to one's most fundamental beliefs about the
world. However, as noted by Solomon, educational researchers tend to be de
jure isolationists who consider development and learning, including world view,
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to be primarily based on "personal experience and personal knowledge" (p.65).
Quite to the contrary, Solomon's research has revealed the a social nature in
learning; and she would no doubt concur, that world view macrostructure is
also socio-culturally dependent World view comes by way of one's
socialization into life. Solomon acknowledged die crucial role of individual
responsibility, yet wrote:
it is also true that belief in our own ideas is astonishingly
hard to form or to maintain without the collaboration of
others. (1987, p.63)
Thus, any discussion of world view must recognize two interlocking realiues.
The first is that world view refers to cognition. The second is that world
view is culturally and socially grounded and maintained. The research
question of world view identification or description should never be raised
without concomitandy raising the questions of cultural and social context.
Indeed, it is contextual variety that leads to different world views, to multiple
realities.
Multiple Realities
It almost goes without saying that d>e concept of world view has no
commonsense counterpart anymore than do the models one calls photons or
genes. Any world view model is an abstraction, derived from certain observed
phenomena, but not a picture of those phenomena. To study world view is
thus, to take an ideational (as opposed to a materialistic) approach to cultural
studies. Those who take this approach are called cognitive ethnographers
(Fetterman, 1989). Indeed, Kearney's principal assumption in logico-
structuralism is that all human activity, even affection, proceeds from cogni
tive roots. This philosophical idealism has led many researchers to speak of
multiple realities. As noted in the preceding section, there is much contextual
variety. People live in community and in relatively circumscribed geographical
locations, but there are many communities and many locations. People live
in different cognitive, social, economic, and physical environments. A world
view is a response to the particular environment in which a people live.
Different environments lead to different ideas about the world, i.e., world
views.
Some scholars prefer to say that the existence of different world
views, means in fact that there are different worlds or different realities. They
would say that reality is what one makes it to be. This inference is important
to the interpretative school of research in education:
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The interpretative [school] embraces a type of philosophical
idealism in believing that the mind creates reality and that an
objective world separate from the perceptions of the person
cannot be known. (Smith, 1987, p.176)
Interpretative researchers in science education10 appeal to the radical
constructivist pliilosophy of Ernst von Glasersfeld, who in paraphrase of
Giambattista Vico, wrote:
God alone can know the real world ... In contrast the human
knower can know only what the human knower has
constructed. (1989, p. 123)
Thus radical constructivism,
discards the notion that knowledge could or should be a
representation of an observer-independent world-in-itself and
replaces it with the demand that the conceptual constructs we
call knowledge be viable in the experiential world of the
knowing subject (1989, p.122).
Interpretations of expenence are all that one can know. One accepts the
validity of interpretations in so far as they are pragmatically viable.
These ideas hear a striking resemblance to the literary theory of
deconstruction:
An old parable says that the hare was the fastest runner of
God's creatures, until he began to wonder how he ran.
Similarly, you are a natural deconstructionist if you have
ever...in the middle of a conversation, realized that you were
having a conversation, and that part of your mind was
scripting your role. Such moments...we ordinarily suppress as
bodiersome interruptions. But what - asks the
deconstructionist - if these moments of vertiginous self-
awareness are actually the reality of our life in language
(McConnell, 1990, p. 106)
A central tenet of deconstruction is the denial that "meaning can always be
grasped in the form of some proper, self-identical concept" (p. 106). Meaning
lies not in the referent of words, but in the words themselves. Similarly, the
"See for example, Tobin, Kahk, &. Fraser (1990).
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radical constructivist does not find that reality can be grasped in the form of
proper, self-identical concepts. Rather, reality for the individual is personally
constructed knowledge based on and validated by expenence. In both
deconstruction and radical constructivism, reality is one's thinking about the
world, not the world itself.
This agnostic view of reality held by radical constructivists is rooted
in subjectivist views of what one can know about reality. Such views range
from the moderate position taken by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions to the extremism of Feyerabend's Against Method. In radical
constructivism, the centrality of ontological reality gives way to epistemological
reality. This does offer certain epistemological advantages. Radical
constructivism obviates the perennial question plaguing realism, how can one
verify knowledge of reality? The constructivist accomplishes this by declaring
the question unimportant One then changes the subject to the process of
constructing and validating knowledge, where validity refers to viability (von
Glasersfeld, 1989, p.122). Furthermore, the constructivist using the notion of
viabdity, has Utile difficulty accounting for the large number of world views
that exist among people. This much has its appeal, though the science
educator will not find that radical constructivism is without problems.
Radical constructivism, and other radical forms of idealism,
immediately come into conflict with commonsease. It is a situation
reminiscent of Samuel Johnson's reaction to Berkeley's philosophy of
immaterialism:
The good Dr. Johnson and James Boswell were walking
down a London street one day discussing George Berkeley's
philosophy of immaterialism. Dr. Johnson, unconvinced by
Berkeley's logic, said to Boswell, "I refute it thus!" Upon
which he turned and soundly kicked the street curb with his
big toe - much to Boswell's amusement!
Along with Boswell one may also be amused, but of course, Samuel Johnson's
refutation of immaterialism was no philosophical tiireat to Berkeley. What
Johnson did was to dramatically and humorously present the wisdom of
common folk and everyday, ordinary life. In the everyday view of things, it
is only one step further to say that not only is the world real, it is also
knowable. An objective, knowable reality is very much apart of the Western
world view. In the mainstream of Western tradition, scholars have assumed
that knowledge is based on and circumscribed by an ontological reality; and
that the validity of knowledge is determined by its correspondence with reality.
Scholars have argued that the centrality of ontological reality in Western
culture stems from a voluntaristic theology with its concomitant view of an
objective, created world. This was a gradual, but significant Medieval
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divergence from ancient Greek idealism (Foster, 1934; Klaaren, 1977; Oakley,
1961). The point of this is, commonsense rooted in world view is a powerful
force. Many scholars in esoteric fields find radical constructivism to be a
tenable position, a profitable one for research. Regardless of its merits,
however, it must be realized that in the larger field of practicing educators,
radical constructivism and extreme concepts of multiple realities will face
formidable, culturally-sanctioned opposition.
The promotion of radical constructivism runs counter not only to what
most students and teachers believe about the world, but also counter to what
most scientists believe (Ratzsch, 1986). One might say that coming to science
from within Western culture, the default position is critical realism. For
critical reahsts the importance of ideas is that they are attempts at
understanding an ontoIogicaJly real world (Hart, 1984; Peacocke, 1984)." As
alluded to above, the difficulty with realism and what has motivated
subjectivism, is the uncertainty of knowledge. Knowledge changes, so how
can one ever be sure that what is known is really the truth about the world?
Critical reahsts recognize the importance of this question and thus there are
numerous discussions of verification and corroboration (Brown, 1987; Hodson,
1982a&b).
Of course, commitment to realism stems not from its difficulties, but
from its advantages. For a realist, science is an effort to understand natural
phenomenon, not merely explain (Martin, 1972). Radical constructivism and
the notion of viability reduces science to a pragmatic program for gaining
control of natural phenomenon, true understanding inherently unattainable. The
desire to understand what the world is really like, however, is the force that
drives progress:
it was precisely because Galileo took a realist interpretation
of Copernican theory, and set about solving the problems it
created, that progress was made. Realism provides the incen
tive for the development of better theories and better instru
ments for observation. (Hodson, 1982b, p.23)
These are indeed, weighty philosophical issues that one cannot forever dodge.
As the first section of this chapter clearly indicated, world view is a
philosophical concept. And though the relative merits of realism and radical
constructivism are debatable, in time the issues of ontology and epistemology
"References to realism are always references to critical realism where the problems of
perception and verification are recognized. Typically references to realism in the interpretive
literature are to naive realism (e.g., Briscoe el at, 1990).
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that these philosophies raise must be more adequately addressed. However,
discussions of ontology in conjunction with world view tend to obscure the
fact that philosophy is neither the same as, nor analogous to, world view.
For now, one may take to heart Jacobs' comment that "philosophers'
definitions and discussions need not detain an anthropologist" (1964, p.366),
nor for that matter an educational cognitive ethnographer.
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World View Theory
This chapter introduces the logico-structural model of world view. To
begin with however, a review of existing world view research in the science
education literature is provided as a background against which to contrast
logico-structuralism.
World View in the Science Education
Research Literature
World view or the related view of the world actually appears quite often
in the education literature. The ERIC/CUE indexes list hundreds of
documents containing the term. As Wolters said, it appears to be a term we
cannot do without. Yet for all its use world view is seldomly defined in any
depth let alone developed within a theoretical context Neither are there many
substantial world view investigations. The infrequency of world view research
in education stems from two difficulties, the first of which is presbyopia.
World View Theory
There is an ancient Chinese proverb that roughly translates, "If you
want to know about the sea, don't bother asking the fish." World view is the
.sea in which people swim. Because of its intimate proximity, because a
person perceives everything through it, world view itself is virtually invisible.
An American unaware of his or her unique American world view. A scien
tist or science educator is unaware of the culture of science. Further, the
observations of events in a culture of a different world view (e.g., the taking
of standardized tests, participation in the Eucharist, or Fulani initiation rites)
are seen through the lenses of one's own world view and judged accordingly.
Awareness of other world views begins however, the instant one steps out of
his own culture and into another (see e.g., Dugan, 1987). Ordinarily the
duration of a handshake is of no conscious concern, for example, nor is the
appropriateness of a greeting. In a different cultural one suddenly finds that
many of the implicitly held rules of conduct no longer work. Thus it is, that
in the literature of science education the most frequent use of world view and
related concepts is by those suiiggling with the problems of developing science
education in societies where modern science is not an aspect of indigenous
culture (e.g., Luttcrodt, 1980; Cobern, 1983; Hewson & Hamlyn, 1985).
To some extent educators have responded to the issue of subcultures
within American society. In die 1980's science educators sought to recast
traditional science curricula in a new social oriented mold, bringing about the
Science, Technology, and Society movement (Patrick & Remy, 1985; Bybee,
1987). Though there is much to recommend the STS movement, one must
recognize that the frame of reference has not changed. The curriculum
developers see the world though the same world view. This is instantly
recognizable by someone from without. For example, M. Ogawa who views
science from a Japanese perspective, argued that the term society should be
replaced by the term culture,
because...science has evolved from the western culture and...
should, therefore be seen not in terms of science-society, but
a science-culture perspective. (1986, p. 114)
The distinction between society and culture is crucial. According to
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, culture is "an ordered system of meaning and
of symbols, in terms of which social interaction takes place." Whereas,
society refers to "the pattern of social interaction itself (1973). The non-
westerner is immediately aware of a tension because the system of meaning
and symbols in science is not the same as the system in his or her traditional
culture. Thus, education in science is a cross-cultural issue.
Ogawa argued that the specific issues for resolution between
traditional, non-western culture and the culture of science are, view of man
31
CHAPTER 3
and nature, and ways of thinking (p.116). These are very much world view
issues and have been picked up again and again by researchers doing cross-
cultural work from Nepal to Jordan, to Nigeria, to Papua New Guinea, to
Navajo reservations (e.g., Dart & Pradhan, 1967; Dart, 1971; Nduka, 1974;
Maddock, 1975a&b; Bajah, 1981; Hewson & Hamlyn, 1985; Jegede &
Okebukola, 1988a).
The cross-cultural work of M.B. Ogunniyi is a good example. He has
written a series of thoughtful papers each dealing with some aspect of the
relationship between scientific and traditional African world views (1983, 84,
85, 88). Though he has never defined the term, nor provided a theoretical
model of world view, he implies that a world view involves presuppositions
about specific aspects of the world. According to Ogunniyi, the world of an
African is monistic/vitalistic while that of the modern scientist is
irrational/impersonal. Cause and effect for an African is teleological, but
mechanistic for a scientist. Okebukola and Jegede agree:
causality is seen in terms of volition and not in terms of
mechanistic laws. Things do not 'just happen' in the
traditional African society; events have a cause, but that cause
is seen in personal terms. (1988, p.3)
With respect to the nature of being, Odhiambo wrote:
The thread that constandy runs through the African's
worldview is one of life, or force, or vital-force. All beings -
whether human, animal, plant, or inanimate -possess vital-
force of their own. (1972, p.43)
There is no presbyopia here because of the stark contrast between a traditional
African world view and the way in which modern science views Man, nature,
and causality.1 However, in the Western world where modern science had its
birth, science is so much apart of the visible, national cultures that many
Westerners fad to see science as a cultural artifact Americans often fail to
understand that there exist American subcultures that on occasion experience
the same type of tensions that traditional, non-western peoples experience. For
example, in the feminist literature it has been noted that the impersonal,
formal view of nature prominent in science can conflict with the more
personal, informal orientation of many women (Halpin, 1989; Whatiey, 1989).
'For an enlightening discussion of the African world view see Temples (1959); Jahn (1961);
Odhiambo (1972); Idowu (1973). Also the novels Chinua Achebe and Cheikh Hamidou Kane can
help provide a vicarious understanding of cultural tension and conflict.
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For another example, the mechanistic explanations of science have the
potential for conflict with the teleological view of life held by orthodox
Christians (Newbigin, 1986).
The second difficulty inhibiting the use of world view concepts is
inadequacy of definition. As interesting and significant as is the work of
Ogunniyi, Okebukola and others, none of these researchers has offered an
analytical, operational definition of world view, let alone a coherent articulated
model. For the most part, neither have Western researchers.2 People who use
the term world view tend not define it or define it only vaguely:
one's view of the world
our understanding of man and nature
our type of thinking
how we understand cause and effect
In the literature of anthropology and philosophy, W.T. Jones (1972) found
thirteen different synonyms for world view, commenting that:
Critics suspect that a concept so variously named is itself
somewhat vague, and this suspicion doubtless explains why
some students of culture prefer to ignore the notion of world
view altogether...(p.79).
When Ninian Smart (1982) referred to world view as a synonym for religion
and ideology, including secular ideology, he identified the sense of the term
as most people outside of anthropology use it The result of this ambiguity
of definition is that many researchers fail to see how world view can be a
useful concept in science education research. In 1974, Brent Kilbourn
pioneered the use of world view in empirical science education research. In
1984, he wrote a second article in which he summarized his earlier work.
However, with the exception of a 1988 paper by Proper, Wideen and Ivany,
there has been no further empirical education research where world view is
involved as a key concept.
The Root Metaphor Approach to World View Research
Kilboum's work is worthy of study. He noted Roberts' comment that
"virtually every science teaching program tries to get youngsters to adopt a
scientific way-to-explain" (Roberts, 1972, p.l). He understood this to be a
*These remarks thus are not a criticism of non-westem researchers. On the contrary, they are
to be commended for their good vision.
33
CHAPTER 3
world view issue. He also understood the tremendous complexity of world
view and the inadequacy of typical definitions (Kilboum, 1984, p.36).
Kilbourn, recognizing that world view in the hidden curriculum is unavoidable,
investigated world view as implicitly projected by secondary biology textbooks.
In Stephen C. Pepper's philosophical treatment of world view published in a
book titled World Hypotheses (1942), Kilbourn found an analytical tool which
he felt solved the problem of ambiguity.3
Pepper's argument is that individuals draw inferences or hypotheses
from the myriad of daily experience. From this one derives meaning and
explanation. To the extent that any of these hypotheses lack scope and
precision, they are less than ideal. According to Pepper, an ideal hypothesis
"is one that all facts wdl corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope. Such
a hypothesis is a world hypothesis" (p.77). World hypotheses can be
identified by root metaphor theory:
A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a
clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of
commonsense fact and tries if he cannot understand other
areas in terms of this one. This original area becomes then
his basic analogy or root metaphor. He describes as best he
can the characteristics of this area, or, if you will, discri
minates its structure. A list of its structural characteristics
becomes his basic concepts of explanation and description.
(1942, p.91)
According to Pepper, "a world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor"
(p.96). He concluded that there are six possible world hypotheses by
identifying six root metaphors. Two, animism and mysticism, he deemed
inadequate based on lack of scope and precision. The four adequate
metaphors are: formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism. As
explained in the literature:
Formism is preoccupied with the form of things, with the
similarity of this or these instances to an idealized form.
Taxonomic botany is a perfect example... (Roberts, 1982,
p.279)
Mechanistic thinking, which derives its name from mechanics,
is called the thinking of the experimental scientist (Harris et
*For other examples of research employing Pepper's root metaphor theory see Harris et al.
(1977); Morris & Hursh (1979); Germer et al. (1982); Roberts (1982); Johnson (1987).
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al., 1977, p.538). Formistic thinking shades into mechanistic
thinking when one asks after the causes, the influences, or
even the correlates...(Roberts, 1982, p.279)
Organistic thinking has been called systems thinking, pattern
thinking...Rather than focusing on single elements or linear
relationships, the organistic thinker sees the world in terms
of complex constellations or patterns with an implicit order
...(Harris et al., 1977, p.538)
Contextualism is a system of thought that focuses on the
event in its context We have no adequate knowledge of an
event..until we know the context in which it occurs...
(Roberts, 1982, p.279)
Though none of the researchers using Pepper's theory have mentioned it, in
a 1970 article Pepper added one further root metaphor. Selectivism, or selec
tive system, functions as follows with respect to means and ends:
if the drive for the means fails to yield satisfaction to the
drive for the end, the former drive is eliminated ... the
dynamic structure of the superordinate act spontaneously
selects against incorrect subordinate acts and for the correct
ones. (p. 164)
Quite reasonably, Kilbourn and researchers after him equated world
hypotheses with world view, though Pepper did not use this term himself.
Kilbourn took Pepper's root metaphor theory as his world view, analytical
device for evaluating the implicit projection of world view in secondary
biology textbooks. Based on his observation that Pepper's root metaphor
mechanism most closely matched the majority of explanations given in the
textbooks examined, he concluded that most biology textbooks project a
mechanistic world view. At first look it appears that Kilbourn's adoption of
root metaphor theory solved the principal hindrance to world view research.
Upon further consideration however, it becomes apparent that a concept of
world view derived from Pepper's work does not appreciably reduce
conceptual ambiguity after all.
The difficulty can be seen more clearly in the Proper, Wideen and
Ivany study (1988), a study which purportedly analyzed the world views
science teachers projected in their classrooms. They found that an individual
teacher at times uses explanations corresponding to more than one of Pepper's
root metaphors (p. 554). They concluded that an individual teacher at times
projects different world views. The observation is not surprising, but it makes
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little sense to claim that a teacher's world view, that is, the teacher's
culturally-dependent generally subconscious, fundamental organization of the
mind changes from time to time during the class. The problem lies with
Pepper's root metaphor theory. As a theory of world view it is simply too
limited. Pepper's theory is about nature and causality; and though these are
necessary parts of a world view, view of nature and causality are not
sufficient to form a world view. In Chapter 4, an alternate interpretation of
the Proper, Wideen and Ivany data will be offered.
The principal value of the Kilbourn and the Proper, Wideen and Ivany
studies is that they are first steps in doing empirical world view research in
science education.'' As such they raised important epistemological questions.
However, the further use of world view in education research requires a move
beyond Pepper to a theory of world view that more articulately, more
operationally defines this fundamental, cognitive macrostructure with all of its
possible variations. For this one must look to the literature of cultural
anthropology.
Anthropological World View Studies
World view is a term more familiar to cultural anthropologists than
to educators, yet even for anthropologists the lack of an adequate theory of
world view has been a problem:
Although world view is one of the central subjects of
American cultural anthropology, there is surprisingly little
theoretical literature concerning it...(p.l). Although world
view is a subject of immense importance in the social
sciences and philosophy, a coherent theory of world view is
nonexistent (p.9). This lack of a conceptual framework has
been one of the main obstacles to the study of particular
world views and their cross-cultural assessment (Kearney,
1984, p.l)
Kearney's research is a response to this problem. He attempted to provide a
theory that defines world view with the articulation necessary for guiding the
cross-cultural study and assessment of world views. It may be argued that
due to numerous American subcultures, there exists in American society
significant world view variation. A further reasonable conjecture is that tliis
*Teacher beliefs is a related avenue of research. Munby (1986) uses metaphor as an analytical
device in his research, while I^edbetter (1987) employs the concept of theoretical orientation, for
example.
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variation influences the process of education, particularly science education.
Therefore, Kearney's world view theory has important implications for
educational research as well.
Kearney's book begins with a historical review of the concept of
world view in American anthropology. The general paradigm used by
American anthropologists doing world view research has been the thematic
paradigm (or monothematic, configurationahst, or pattern paradigm). The
thematic approach is an,
attempt to discover and describe the underlying 'pattern,'
'configuration,' 'basic personality,' 'ethos,' or 'world view'
of a society. What all of these concepts have in common is
that they refer to an hypothesized mental principle that
organizes in a distinctive way nonmaterial elements...of a
given society. These mental constructs are assumed to shape
social and cultural behavior and the material and nonmaterial
results of this behavior. (Kearney, 1984, p.23)
The attempts made by cultural anthropologists to identify underlying cultural
themes (or hypothesized mental principles), fall into two traditions. One is
built direcdy upon the work of Franz Boas (1911) and the other on the later
theoretical developments of Robert Redfield (1941,52). The Boasian tradition
includes such anthropologists as Ruth Benedict (1934) and Margaret Mead
(1928). As mentioned in Chapter 2, Benedict's Patterns of Culture typifies tius
tradition. She believed that by careful analysis one could find in a culture a
single psychological theme that fundamentally ordered that culture's world
view, a premise heavily influenced by Gestalt psychology.5
Redfield employed the Boas and Benedict total culture approach to
world view research. In contrast, however, he considered the search for a
single, overarching theme that would describe a culture to be an oversim
plified approach. His innovation was to reconstruct the concept of world view
as a composite of universally found categories (or universals). Specifically,
these are a unitary Self and a tripartite NonSelf. The NonSelf represents
Humanity (society), Nature, and God (or the transcendent). Redfield thus
maintained the Weltanschauung, total culture concept while introducing an arti
culation that allowed the researcher to identify and study variation within a
culture. The Redfield model allows one to say, for example, that the Western
world view is characteristically mechanistic. The model further allows one to
'For a more recent article advocating a configurationalist approach to world view studies see
Kieman (1980).
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identify intra world view variations such as transcendent and secular variations
of the characteristically mechanistic, Western world view.
Kearney recognized the importance of Redfield's theoretical advance,
but still found it too limited:
Redfield's concept of world view is mainly descriptive.
Insofar as he speculated on the causes for differing world
views he did so very generally...he did not attempt to explain
why a certain type of society may have one world view, nor
how world views change. Nor did he attempt to explain
what connection there is between world view, environment,
and behavior. (1984, pp.38&39)
Following Redfield, Kearney reconstructed world view as a composite of
universals. His unique contnbution to world view research is a model of
world view with sufficient articulation to move world view research beyond
the level of description to a level of analysis.
The Kearney Model of World View
The Kearney model begins with the idea that a world view is an
organized set of fundamental, cognitive presuppositions about reality. He
assumed that this organization is shaped by the,
...internal equilibrium dynamics among [world view
assumptions]. This means that some of these assumptions and
resultant ideas, beliefs, and actions predicated on them are
logically and structurally more compatible than others, and
that the entire world view will 'strive' toward maximum
logical and structural consistency. The second and main force
giving coherence and shape to a world view is the necessity
of having to relate to the external environment, (p.52)
In other words, a world view tends to be internally consistent, in that
presuppositions are logically integrated and universals are structurally
integrated; hence, the model is termed logico-structural. A world view is
externally valid in that the human need to relate to the external environment
fosters coherence.
Kearney's ideas are similar to Redfield's. Both conceived of world
view as a structural composite. However, based on an extensive review of
ethnographic research, Kearney developed a composite of seven, basic
cognitive categories or universals: Self, The Other, Relationship, Classification,
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Causality, Space, and Time (see Figure #4, p.43). The Self and The Other are
Redfield's categories. The salient difference between the models is that
Kearney's model illuminates die articulation between Self and The Other. For
example, it focuses one's attention on vital issues such as relationship of the
Self to The Other, including the impact of The Other upon the Self. It raises
questions of how The Other is classified by the Self. How does the Self
understand cause to operate in The Otiicr, etc.6
Kearney likens the seven universal categones to the diagnostic
categories used by physicians:
Although the doctor is confronted with a variety of patients,
he can presumably describe the most significant medical facts
about them in terms of...features common to all patients, e.g.,
blood pressure, pulse, respiration, (p.65)
While the physician's categories are filled by measurements, the world view
categories are filled by presuppositions. Logically consistent presuppositions
about reality are the content of world view universals. Each universal is
composed of a hierarchically arranged set (or sets) of presuppositions, at the
end of which is a final, absolute presupposition. This is a first order
presupposition or an ultimate presupposition beyond which there are no others.
One might think of a 1st order presupposition as akin to Aristotle's final
cause. At the opposite end, tiiese hierarchies blend into the cognitive
frameworks with which educators are more familiar, e.g., commonsense and
scientific theories. Collingwood provides an amusing story in which both ends
of a hierarchy are apparent
...if you were talking to a pathologist about a certain disease
and asked him 'What is the cause of the event E which you
say sometimes happens in this disease?' he will reply "The
cause of E is C; and if he were in a communicative mood
he might go on to say 'That was established by So-and-so,
in a piece of research that is now regarded as classical.' You
might go on to ask: T suppose before So-and-so found out
what the cause of E was, he was quite sure it had a cause?'
the answer would be 'Quite sure, of course.' If you say,
'Why?' he will probably answer 'Because everything that
happens has a cause.' If you are importunate enough to ask
'But how do you know that everything that happens has a
cause?' he will probably blow up in your face, because you
*Keamey's categories are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4.
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have put your finger on one of his absolute presupposi
tions...But if he keeps his temper and gives you a civil and
candid answer, it wdl be to the following effect 'That is a
thing we take for granted in my job. We don't question it'
(1940, pp.31&32)
At one end of the pathologist's mental framework is his knowledge of diseases
and scientific research. At the other is a first order presupposition
(Collingwood's absolute presupposition) in the world view universal, Causality.
In this example the pathologist is drawing upon a typically Western,
mechanical view of causality. Another person coming from a very different
world view, or perhaps even from a Western subculture, might draw upon, for
example, a more teleological or more fatalistic causal presupposition. In
principle, not only cultures and subcultures of people, but also individuals can
be identified by world view variations which result from the content variation
in the seven world view universals.
Presuppositions Are More Than Beliefs
At this point one may wish to ask how world view and belief may
be distinguished, if at all. Certainly, behefs are implied in the terms, for
example, Christian world view, Islamic world view, or secular world view.
Ketner (1972) in his dissertation An Essay on the Nature of World Views argued
that the basic concepts held within a world view are indeed fundamental
beliefs. On the other hand, Kearney accepted the Needham (1972) position
that belief itself is "a concept particular to the Western world" or Western
world view (1984, p.51).
The arguments are rather esoteric and need not be considered at this
time. Given that this text was written from within Western culture, Ketner's
position that a world view is a fundamental system or network of beliefs is
assumed. Belief and presupposition overlap considerably. However, the above
emphasis on the adjective fundamental is crucial. Presupposition is the more
specific term, and thus more appropriate for use in world view studies. Belief
refers to a conviction of truth. The conviction can be by credit For
example, something is believed because of the authority of the source. The
conviction can also be by credence which means that there exists a mental
acceptance of truth. Belief by credence may come about because evidence
has been shown. Neither of these types of belief implies certitude or trust in
the belief, or that the belief is of any importance. However, as in religious
belief, belief can imply all three, certitude, trust, and importance. The exact
meaning of belief is determined by the context of usage. The difference
between world view presupposition as belief, and ordinary belief is really one
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of degree.7 To begin with, there is always an earnestness and certitude about
a world view presupposition that is not always present in ordinary belief.
Collingwood's pathologist would no doubt consider his causality presupposition
to be something much more certain than ordinary belief for which he would
admit doubt
Ordinary belief also implies consciousness, while presuppositions are
frequendy subconscious. Ordinary behefs tend to have greater visibility than
presuppositions. Many ordinary beliefs are easy to verbalize or describe, much
more so than presuppositions. Ordinary behefs are much more easily taught
and learned. Furthermore, in the light of daily experience ordinary behefs are
malleable, while presuppositions tend to be self-confirmatory. Ordinary behefs
are many and specific, but operate only on appropriate occasions. World view
presuppositions are superordinate behefs. They are much fewer and tend to
be in constant operation "though doubUess often with only a low charge"
(Jones, 1972, p.83). Finally, while there are visible evidences of all ordinary
beliefs, the indications of presuppositions are far more subtie and indirect
Consider the case of two recent education articles containing the term
belief, one in reference to world view and one in reference to ordinary belief.
Bloom (in press) referred to belief as a part of a person's context of meaning,
e.g., that the human species is qualitatively superior to all other animal
species. Compare this usage with the use of belief in a study by Shaw &
Cronin (1989). As examples of beliefs among preservice teachers they gave:
Students are not automatically ready to work...
Students are not well-trained listeners...
Students sometimes try to bother teachers...(p.9)
Clearly Bloom's example of belief is by nature superordinate. The belief that
the human species is qualitatively superior to all other animal species
influences many aspects of life in many circumstances, but the belief that
students are not automatically ready to work basically only influences life in
the classroom. The first example concerns fundamental categories, and has
breadth of scope and generality. The example from Shaw and Cronin is
subordinate in nature due to its specificity. The modifier framework of
preceding belief does give more of the presupposition sense. Nevertheless, to
avoid semantic confusion, there is merit in reserving the term belief for its
ordinary connotation.
Tliis line of argument is based on Jones' notion of wide-range as opposed to narrow-range
vectors (1972, p.83). Wide-range vectors according to Jones comprise one's belief space or
world view.
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Logico-Structuralism
To summarize the arguments thus far, world view is the
culturally-dependent implicit, fundamental organization of the mind. This
implicit organization is composed of presuppositions which predispose one to
feel, think, and act in predictable patterns. Though at a fundamental level
presuppositions are behefs, the cardinal nature of presupposition requires one
to always distinguish between belief at the presuppositional level and belief at
lesser levels. According to logico-structuralism, presuppositions are the content
of seven, universal categories: Self, The Other (NonSelf), Classification,
Relationship, Causality, Space, and Time. The composite of these seven
categories form one's world view. The balance of this chapter is given to a
description of these categories. Wherever possible the description includes
material from the literature of science education and related areas in an effort
to demonstrate the appropriateness of world view research to science education.
Logico-Structuralism
Self and NonSelf: The 1st Order Universals1
Self: Universe (or cosmos) is the English language term for ultimate
inclusiveness. Within the universe an individual's primary point of reference
is himself or herself, i.e., the Self The functioning of any human society is
dependent upon self-identification and culturally determined notions of the
nature of self (Hallowell, 1955). Every self (or a person's sense of self) exists
and interacts within an environment, i.e., the NonSelf. Thus the ultimate
inclusiveness is composed of the Self and all that is not the Self, i.e., the
NonSelf. These two are the 1st order universals and together form the
principal axis of a world view (Kearney, 1984, pp.68-70). This axis can be
seen in Figure #4, Kearney's diagrammatic summary of logico-structuralism.
Relationship
/
/
Self f= ^ Classification £ => NonSelf
Causality
Time
Fig. 4. Kearney's Logico-Structual World View Model
(Kearney. 1984, p.106)
The nature of Self varies between two polar extremes. At one pole
are the individuals whose Self is continuous with the cosmos. These
'The seven universals neatly fit three groups here referred to as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order
universal categories, though Kearney does not observe these distinctions. Secondly, the term The
Other in addition to being awkward fails to convey the full sense intended, "all that is other
than the self." NonSelf has been substituted as a more self-evident, less awkward term.
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individuals identify themselves with the NonSelf. The distinction between Self
and NonSelf is minimal. In a sense, all is Self. At the other pole, nothing
is Self. For these individuals the Self has become so depersonalized that they
feel they have ceased to exist In American society individuals at the first
pole are mystics. At the second pole they are psychotics. Piaget has argued
that from birth normal cognitive development is based on the gradual,
progressive elaboration of a distinction between Self and NonSelf (Piaget
1969).
Researchers have not shown much interest in the nature of self as a
factor in science education. Locus of control research comes closest to
addressing this world view issue.2 In a 1982 essay on thought-life and life
style, Logan and O'Heam discussed their view that die modern American sense
of self is incompatible with science learning:
The proficient science student should have (as a condition
necessary, but not sufficient for science success) a self-
concept as an acto-doer-observer; he ore she should approach
experience and the world from a strong sense of self as I (I
act 1 do, I observe). Such a sense of self is a necessary
component of empirical investigations, in which the self-as-
observer stands (as "I") detached from the world and observes
relationships among events. The individual whose sense of
self is more one of "me" (receiver, consumer) will be vir
tually incapable of standing apart as "I" and observing how
events relate to each other. He or she is too involved in
observing the self as the object (p.527)
This is a provocative statement that raises several questions about science
learning and sense of self. As an opinion based on nonempirical cultural and
philosophical studies, one has to wonder if this distinction between the action
oriented "I" person and the passive, consumer oriented "me" person can be
detected in the classroom. If so, is it a factor in science education as Logan
and O'Hearn claim? Would not an action oriented, communal "we" person do
just as well as Logan and O'Heam's "I" person? Does the Logan and
O'Hearn description of the modern self apply cross-culturally? Or, to what
degree is the detachment Logan and O'Hearn speak of necessary for one to see
relationships in events? Logan and O'Heam's article has not been widely
The section on Relationship, pages 49-52, speaks to research on locus of control and frames
of reference.
44
Logicc-Structura^ism
quoted, yet from a world view perspective they have hit upon a rich research
avenue.3
NonSelf: As stated above, the NonSelf is everything in the universe
except the Self. The NonSelf can be divided into domains of equivalent,
nonequivalent, or hierarchial taxonomic status. The simplest division is into
domains of human environment and physical environment, or society and
nature (see Figure #5). Most cultures, including Western culture, have
preferred Redfield's tripartite division: Humanity (society), Nature, and God
(the transcendent). Some of the most bitter controversies in American public
education can be traced to differences in die Self-NonSelf axis and domains
of the NonSelf. For example, a group of citizens may believe that the
education establishment is promulgating a world view solely based on society
and nature. In opposition stands a group of educators who may believe that
die citizen group is unjustly trying to promote in the schools a religious world
view.
belt
NonSelf
Society
Na ture
:elf
N o n S e 1f
Society
Nature
God
Fig. 5. Examples of Classifications in the NonSelf
As one would expect, the aspect, of the NonSelf of interest in the
science classroom is nature. From a world view perspective, one would ask:
What is the image of nature projected in the science classroom? What is
nature like according to science instruction? There is a rich hterature on what
people in different societies and at different times have believed about nature
(see Glacken, 1967; Knopf, 1987). Is it wise for educators to assume that
'For further information concerning the concept of Self, see Gergen (1971) and Mauss (1985).
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students coming into the science classroom will fully accept as both
appropriate and important the image of nature projected there, when the
literature indicates that there are many views of nature? Environmentalists
have taken an interest in student beliefs about nature and perceptions of nature
(e,g., Knopf, 1987). It is an interest that should be extended to all science
educators.
Classification, Relationship, Causality: The 2nd Order Universals
Classification: The Self-NonSelf differentiation is the clearest, perhaps
most significant example of a presupposition in the universal category
Classification:
Within a cognitively differentiated universe the most
fundamental classification categories are Self and the
[NonSelf]; this is the reason they are treated as universal.
(Kearney, 1984, p.80).
Beyond the Self-NonSelf classification there are classifications within the
NonSelf domain. Figure #5 shows two classification possibilities for the
NonSelf, but there are many. A third possibility is the pantheistic fusion of
God and Nature as found in classical Greek thought, some Eastern religions,
and in some areas of New Age thought Furthermore, there are
subclassifications within classifications. Different partitionings of the world
can result in frustrating encounters, especially when the world view variations
involve teacher and student. Consider this student/teacher exchange that
follows when a teacher asks the class to name the two groups into which all
living things can be divided:
Lucy: People?
Teacher: People are just part of one of the two divisions.
Peter Plants and animals.
Teacher: Good for you, Peter. That's right. Everything in this
world is either plant or animal. People, Lucy, are
animals, so they fit in this division.
Lucy: People aren't animals, they're humans.
Teacher: People are animals, the same as cats and dogs and
so on. [Much laughter and several loud objections
by a large numberof pupils speaking simultaneously.
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It appears that they disagree with this last statement.]
People are animals. What's wrong with that.7 They're
not plants are they?
Jimmy: But people talk, and have two legs and arms, and
move and can think. Animals aren't like that,
[laughter] ("Russell & Munby, 1989, p.108)
Similar exchanges have been reported by other researchers investigating
students' untutored ideas about life (e.g., Looft, 1974; Brumby, 1981, 82).
Concepts such as higher and lower animals, or the belief that human life is
qualitatively different and superior to other animal life are indicative of
Classification presuppositions concerning life forms in nature. World view
theory suggests that students' ideas, such as that expressed in die above
dialogue, are better understood in the light of their world view presuppositions.
New investigations from a logico-stxuctural perspective would ask what
categories these students are applying to nature and how these relate to the
categories used in instruction.
The ist
NonSelf-domains 1 Real J Unreal
Supernatural ' Gcd ; Ghosts
Nature ! People | Dreams
NonSelf-domains
' Reai 1 Unreal
Nature ; People | Gcd
Fig. 6. The Attributes: Real and Unreal
Yet another classification of the NonSelf is between the real and
unreal. Figure #6 represents the NonSelf domains for a theist and atheist. In
this example real and unreal are attributes of the various domains into which
the NonSelf is classified, but not domains themselves. For the theist some of
the content of the supernatural domain is real, but for the atheist, the entire
domain is unreal. Kearney righdy pointed out that one must know the attri
butes of a NonSelf-domain as well as the content:
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it is possible that two people may conceptually group
...ghosts, spirits, the Devil. Knowing this grouping alone tells
us little about their respective world views. However, if we
know that for one person these items are grouped together as
elements of folk tales and superstitions, while for another
sources of sickness and sin, we gain insight into the asso
ciated dimensions of Causality and Relationship in their
respective world views (1984, p.82).
Kearney's example from anthropology can easily be replaced with one drawn
from a science classroom. The following dialogue is from Wightman's
investigations of students' understanding of particle theory:
P: I can't really explain, but there's summat where you think,
well this table it's made up of particles - I think it's too,
well you can't see any particles or owt, so its just - just can't
believe it You know, that this table's made out of particles -
hundreds of millions.
T: You don't believe it?
P: Well, I do in me own way, you know, but well wood's
wood, I mean it grows from trees - you know more or less -
well - sometimes - if a teacher tells you that its made out of
particles you think - well fair enough its made out of
particles, but its, you can't really believe that this table's
made out of particles.
T: What about the atmosphere in this room? Can you accept that
that is made of particles?
P: Not really... (1989, p.69)
There may well be times when a science teacher and a student agree on the
conceptual grouping of nuclei, atoms, and molecules, as do the teacher and
student above. The attribute however, for the teacher is submicroscopic
reality, while for the student it may be simple unreality. For one it may be
significance, while for the other it is insignificance. The science teacher and
the student are each using classification categories that reflect his or her
attitudes and presuppositions about the nature of reality/
*See page 54 for an example from science education where Classification and Causality
presuppositions are working in conjunction.
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Relationship: It is difficult if not impossible for anyone to discuss
Self and NonSelf totally independent of each other. To speak of the Self
invariably involves some context i.e., the NonSelf. To speak of nature is to
invariably invoke the terms of Man's relationship with nature. It is in the
interactions of Self and NonSelf that the senses of Self and NonSelf form.
They are structurally integrated; thus, the 2nd order universal of logico-
structuralism, Relationship, i.e., the relationship between the Self and NonSelf:
The Relationship universal arises from the necessary condition
that survival of Self depends on its interaction with the
[NonSelf], the latter being both the social and physical
environments in which the Self is located. The Relationship
universal is important because the way in which people view
interaction with other people and things in their habitats
significantly affects the way in which they behave. (Brown
1984, pp.99&100)
For example, a child raised in a warm, secure home can be expected to
develop a confident sense of self. The child comes to know the world (i.e.,
the NonSelf) to be orderly and nonthreatening. An abused child more likely
grows up with low self-esteem. A chdd raised in an environment of
unexpected trauma may come to see himself as a powerless being living in an
unpredictable world.
The concept of psychological differentiation as developed by Witkin et
al. (1962) suggests that society and culture strongly influence one's
relationship with the environment:
Differentiation refers to an individual's segregation of
psychological activities, one instance of which is the way
boundaries are set up between an individual and the outside
world. As these boundaries develop, the individual begins to
formulate internal frames of reference, relying less and less
on external sources as guides to behavior. (Hvitfeldt 1986,
p.66)
As a person becomes more reliant on internal frames of reference, that person
becomes more field-independent and less field-dependent. However, among
different socio-cultural groups, what is considered a normal position on an
independent-dependent spectrum varies considerably (e.g., Hvitfeldt, 1986).
Locus of control and locus of responsibdity are avenues of inquiry related to
field of reference concepts. Though not as often studied in cross-cultural con-
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texts, one sees in locus of control and locus of responsibility research the
same implicit recognition of the importance of Relationship presuppositions.5
Of a more phdosophical bent is the presumed status of Self vis-a
vis the NonSelf Fundamentally the status relationship between the Self and
NonSelf can be one of harmony, subordinance, or dominance. In actuality
there is likely to be mixing. For example, the Self-NonSelf relationship with
regard to the individual and society may be one of harmony, while the
individual-nature relationship one of dominance (Kearney, 1984, pp.72-78).
Historically, a relationship of dominance derived from the Genesis account of
creation was crucial to the development of experimental science (Hooykaas,
1972; Glover, 1984). In the words of one Japanese observer:
in the Western idea, man was not an ordinary part of nature.
He was a specially privdeged creature, and nature was
subordinate to him...he was die master of the natural world,
which was at his disposal to analyze, examine, and make use
of...since the natural world and the whole universe were
manifestations of God's creation, the study of it was not only
a useful but also a highly esteemed endeavor...such an
oudook provided some of the important religious motivation
which fostered the development of modem science in the
Western world. (Watanabe, 1974, p.280)
This dominance theme continues to be important in science today, though not
without problems (see White, 1967; Young, 1974). In stark contrast, for
traditional Chinese and Japanese the relationship between Self and nature is
one of affinity and sympathy. The difference between East and West is nicely
illustrated by a story told to Watanabe by an American missionary to China:
Three men went to see Niagara Falls. One was an Indian
from India, one was a Chinese, and one an American. On
seeing the falls, the Indian, as a matter of course, thought of
his god, manifested in this grandeur of nature. The Chinese
simply wished to have a little hut beside the falls, where he
might invite a friend or two, serve tea, and enjoy
conversation. The American, however, on viewing the falls,
immediately asked himself what could be done to make the
most of such an enormous amount of energy, (p.279)
'For example research see Rotter (1966); Brooks & Hounshell (1975); Helms & Giorgis
(1980); Scharmann (1988).
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Although this story is about stereotypes, there is the essence of truth.
Americans frequently view nature as an object for "mastery" (White, 1967;
Young, 1974). In other cultures nature is more likely to be valued for its
beauty, if not actually held in reverence. These differences in world view
have consequences. Watanabe noted that despite the frequency of earthquakes
in Japan, it was only after contact with Westerners that the Japanese began the
scientific study of earthquakes. According to Watanabe, "this can be explained
largely by [the Japanese] attitude of coexisting with nature" (p.281). American
feminist literature records a similar attitude. The feminine presuppositions
undergirding the Self-NonSelf relationship are characterized by:
interrelatedness and interconnectedness, wholeness and one
ness, inseparability of observer and observed, transcendence
of the either-or dichotomy, dynamic and organic processes
... (Perreault 1979, p.4)
Feminist scholarship such as Keller's seminal biography of Barbara
McClintock, A Feeling for the Organism (1983), however, has helped to
strengthen the feminist contention that good science does not necessarily
require the traditional, Western view of nature.6 It is interesting to note that
some observers believe that the Eastern Self-NonSelf relationship will result
in unique contributions to science, especially in ecology and anthropology.7
The traditional Western dominance theme does not necessarily lead to
reckless individualism nor to the wanton exploitation of nature (Young, 1974).
There are however tiiose who believe that it does so necessitate, and they are
not always gentle in their expressions and acts of opposition. Of the West the
Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan commented:
the modern mechanistic societies lack the vision of self in
man. They recognize only an external mechanistic universe
reflected in the machines that man has devised. This is how
disintegration becomes the key image of the modern world.
(1967, p. 145)
*Also see Gilligan (1982). For a further discussion of a feminist position vis-a-vis a scientific
world view, see Chapter 5, p.70.
7 See for example, Frisch (1963); Watanabe (1974); Harding (1989). For an interesting
discussions of how science education might look incorporating alternatives to a mechanistic view
of nature see Franklin (1980); Miller (1980); and Scheirer (1980).
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In the United States a small but growing group of people have adopted a
radicalized eastern view of the relationship between Self and NonSelf. As a
result organizations such as the Animal Liberation Front and Earth First!
actively seek the end not only of all animal experimentation in science, but as
well an end to meat leather, and wool industries (Los Angeles Times 1989,
p.A6). The radical activists demonstrate how serious world view differences
can be.
Causality: Kearney developed his concept of Causality from a
Piagetian perspective (1984, pp.84-89). Here science educators find more
famdiar ground because of the shared interest in Piagetian theory and cause
and effect. Kearney employed Durkheim's definition of causality:
The first thing which is implied in the notion of the causal
relationship is the idea of efficacy, of productive power, of
active force. By cause we ordinarily mean something capable
of producing a certain change. The cause is the force before
it has shown the power which is in it the effect is this same
power, only actualized. (Durkheim, 1965, p.406)
Kearney argued that an individual constructs his or her world view
based on the dialectical forces in one's life, that is between Self and NonSelf,
especially during formative childhood years. Therefore he incorporated in his
theory Piagetian stages of development where the nature of cause and effect
changes for a child with growth and experience. Following Piaget (1969),
presuppositions of the Causality universal develop through periods of
participation, animism, artificialism, finalism, and force:
...in feelings of 'participation,' there is an assumed affinity
of Self with external objects...closely allied with this is the
notion of 'animism,' which endows things with consciousness
and life. In the third form, 'artificialism,' there is the
uncritical assumption that objects obey wdl and intention, and
in doing so are organized and act for the good of men...that
things exist for and are organized for man is the 'finalistic'
assumption. To the extent that this notion exists, the world
is seen as teleological. The fifth type of adherence is the
notion of 'force' or 'power,' which is attributed to things
such that they make efforts as do muscles. (Kearney, 1984,
p.87)
Kearney argued that Piagetian mental development involves the gradual
development of a mechanical view (or scientific view, see Kearney, p.70) of
causality in conjunction with the gradual elimination of the above five
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adherences, although some often continue into adulthood The extent of
adherences in adulthood is a function of an individual's ability to completely
distinguish between Self and NonSelf, i.e., "dividing off the internal world
from the external" (Piaget 1969, p.246).
Kearney accepted Piaget's dialectical view of mental development and
use of mental stages. He employed Piaget's adherences as aspects of the
Causality universal useful for describing and comparing world views.
However, he rejected Piaget's conclusions as being culturally determined."
Piaget's French Swiss children developed mechanical viewpoints precisely
because they were French Swiss, and not for example, Nuer or Hausa. Taking
mechanical causality as the hallmark of advanced mental development would
doom the majority of the world to mental underdevelopment Robin Horton's
African Traditional Thought and Western Science (1967), is an dluminating
account of traditional African thought. Horton argued that traditional African
thought is indeed complex and formal, but based on a rationality of its own.
However, in contrast to Western thought, it is nonmechanical.9
Of course, among Westerners there are also those whose thinking is
dominated by nonmechanical concepts. Teieologicai thinking is an issue that
has frequendy been addressed in the science education research literature, and
provides a good example of Causality variations in a typical Western world
view. Especially with regard lo the life sciences, researchers have frequendy
noted that some students prefer explanations that have to do with the purpose
of a structure or action.'0 At one level such explanations simply mean that a
consequence can be used to explain an action. The function provides an
explanation for the structure. For example, the pumping of blood is an
explanation for the heart Teleology at this level does not pose a serious
problem in the classroom, if any problem at all. The teieologicai causality
unaccustomed to science, however, is the causality of transcendent purpose.
There is a reason for existence or function that transcends material, mechanical
terms.11 The point is, such a preference does not necessarily indicate cognitive
immaturity. It can just as well indicate that in the students' view of the
'For enlightening accounts of cross-cultural Piagetian research, see Buck-Mores (1975); Cole
& Scribner (1974); Dasen (1974).
*Also see Elkana (1977) and Urevbu (1988).
lfrTherc is an excellent set of articles by Jungwirth on teleology and anthropomorphism
(1975a,b,c; 1977; 1979). Also see Wandersee & Mintzes (1987) for a bibhography of research
on conceptual development with regard to the life sciences.
"See the example in Chapter 6, p.91.
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world, purpose is of primary importance. In such instances tiiere is a
significant mismatch between the presupposition of the student and die
presupposition of classroom instruction.
For two decades science education research on student learning has
been dominated by Piaget's concepts of concrete and formal thought, and the
development of cognitive processes from concrete to formal. In recent years
the investigation of commonsense theories and misconceptions has brought
about a change of focus from the concept of concrete/formal thinking to the
concept of adherences. The next step is to investigate the epistemological
frameworks which make the adherences more intelligible and certainly less
pejorative.
Reinterpreting a Root Metaphor Study: To further illuminate the
concept of causahty as an aspect of world view, it is instructive at this point
to return to Pepper's root metaphor theory and its use in die Proper, Wideen
and Ivany study (1988). These researchers found that their biology teachers
used explanations representing four root metaphor categories: formism,
mechanism, contextualism, and organicism. For example, when the subject
was classification the teachers tended to use formal explanations, but
mechanical explanations with genetics and cell biology (p.554). Such
observations are predictable using the logico-structural model of world view
where there is an articulation between Self, Causality and NonSelf. As one
would expect the world (NonSelf) for these teachers is composed of many
categories. At some appropriate level a categorical distinction in the teachers'
epistemological framework is made between multicellular organisms and
individual cells, including important cellular molecules. The biology teachers'
multicellular category is likely to be further divided according to similarities
and differences among organisms, in other words, according to a standard
phylogenetic taxonomy. In this case the articulation between Causality and
NonSelf is that structural features determine classification, thus the formism
detected in the classroom when the subject is something like phylogeny.
Similarly, at the cellular level the biologist uses many more concepts from
physical science where mechanical explanations predominate. In this case the
articulation between Causahty and NonSelf is that phenomenon at the cellular
level have mechanical causes, thus the mechanism detected in the classroom
when the subject is something like genetics. The teachers in study do not
have variable world views. What they have is a variable concept of causahty
that is rationally related to the their understanding of the world. The root
metaphor theory does not allow one to readdy see this distinction.
Similarly, Kilbourn's 1984 study of textbooks actually speaks only to
one aspect of world view. The sense of causality projected in the biology
textbooks he studied was mechanistic. But what view of nature did the
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textbooks project? What did the textbooks assume about the relationship
between people and nature? Though it does not diminish the value of
Kilboum's research, these and other questions would have to be answered
before this research could accurately be considered a complete world view
analysis.
There are other examples of science education research on teacher
behavior that can profitably be informed by the logico-structural view of
causality. Dagher & Cossman (1990) reported on a qualitative study of
explanations used by junior high science teachers. In their analysis they
classified observed teacher explanations into ten categories, not all of which
were considered desirable for the science classroom. In their concluding
remarks, the researchers noted that in future studies interviewing the teachers
would provide important contextual information concerning the use of
explanation types. The Dagher & Cossman study is quite similar to the
Proper et al. (1988) study. Both investigations involved categorizing teacher
explanations. Unlike the 1988 study, Dagher & Cossman did not use an a
priori classification system, nor did they consider their study to be world
view related. It is, however, as much a world view study as Proper et al.
(1988). The teachers in the classroom use explanations that fit their
partitioning of the world, their understanding of the relationship between Self
and the world, and the different ways to view causality in the world.
Goodson & Walker (1989) contend that, "biographical material on teachers
should be an integral part of accounts of classroom life" (p.111). Quoting a
folkiorist they point out that teacher behavior and teacher are analogous to
song and singer:
I began to realise that for me, the people who sang the
songs were more important than the songs themselves. The
song is only a small part of the singer's life and the life was
usually very fascinating. There was no way I felt I could
understand the songs without knowing something about the
life of the singer, which does not seem to apply in die cases
of most folklorists. They are quite happy to find material
which fits into a preconceived cannon and leave it at diat I
had to know what people thought about the songs, what part
they played in their lives and in the lives of the community.
(Pegg, 1989, p.Ill)
Thus, the teacher interviews that Dagher & Cossman suggest should be used
to put life into their research, that is, the lives of the teachers involved. For
the researchers to understand the teachers' behaviors, let alone to promote
change, the researchers must see teacher behavior in terms of the several
world view categories (e.g., Self, Relationship, NonSelf), not simply Causality
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in isolation. Researchers need to see teacher behavior in the context of teacher
life.8
To conclude this section on Causality it should be noted that some
question the continued use of cause-and-effect mechanistic concepts in science
and science education. Indeed, the contention that cause-and-effect causahty
has disappeared from modern physics has gained a degree of popularity. This
is a philosophically erroneous deduction from modern quantum mechanics. As
Fermilab cosmologist John L. Dykla has recendy written:
All modem science is predicated on the philosophical
assumption that its subject is comprehensible...Of course, the
advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century has
compelled reappraisal of the deterministic paradigm of earlier
science. Still, the activities of physicists are grounded in a
belief in the existence of objective laws that correlate our
observations of natural phenomena and allow at least some
limited measure of successful prediction. (1989, p.169)
Even if one granted in physics a complete change in the understanding of
causality, the rest of science still lives in a rather Newtonian universe.
Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of a science education program not
based on a fairly traditional notion of causahty (AAAS, 1989). The
banishment of Newtonian cause-and-effect causality would itself indicate a
significant world view shift in the Western world.
Space and Time: The 3rd Order Universals
Space: There are many examples of how people view space
differently. Ideas about space are a common difference between urban and
rural dwellers. Unlike his rural cousin, a person who lives in the city often
has hole practical awareness of the compass directions east, west, south, and
north. For the city dweller, direction is generally a matter of uptown,
downtown, left and right. On the other hand, a walk of a short distance for
the rural dweller is likely to translate to a much longer distance for the urban
dweller who is accustomed to more compact space (Musgrove, 1982). In the
science classroom, spatial distances often are very large or exceedingly small.
In either case it is not the space common to the every day experiences of
most children.
The same argument can be used regarding the study of teachers' use of analogies in the
process of explanation. See for example, Treagust et al. (1990) and Duit (1990). For similar
research but with metaphors, see Pope & Gilbert (1983) and Muscari (1988).
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Consider Dart's investigations in Nepal concerning another aspect of
spatialization (1967; 1972). As a part of his studies of readiness for modern
science learning among traditional Nepalese children, Dart had Nepalese and
American chddren draw from memory maps showing the way from home to
school. From the maps he anticipated learning more about how the children
dealt with abstractions. Referring to the maps reproduced in Figure #7, Dart
noted that the,
fifteen-year-old Nepalese boy is apparendy describing the
"process of going" rather than spatial relationships ... in fact,
the house and school are on different paths. An eleven-year-
old US boy includes spatial and directional clues, as well as
symbols, in his map. (1972, p.52)
He concluded that the Nepalese children drew their maps based on "sequential
rather than spatial constructs" (p.54), and that this was quite reasonable given
the environment in which they lived. Dart's concern for these children
wasthat they were accustomed to a type of abstraction that was foreign to
science instruction. In a different setting, David Hawkins noted that people
tend to,
have a perceptual-commonsense way of taking things as 'big'
and 'little' without reliance on the analytically defined
concepts of length, area, and volume. From the
commonsense-perceptual point of view this is entirely
reasonable. (1978, p.7)13
Unfortunately, this commonsense-perceptual view does not well serve the
student or teacher in a science classroom, whether the classroom is in Nepal
or the USA. Hawkins referred to this type of problem as a critical barrier
phenomenon to science which cannot be breached by instructional ingenuity
alone. It requires greater understanding of the personal contexts that students
bring to the classroom.
Another intriguing area of science education research, that may well
involve world view presuppositions in the Space universal, is the research on
visual/spatial thinking. According to McCormack (1988) visual/spatial
thinking:
"Also see Apelman (1982).
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Fig. 7. Maps Drawn by Nepalese and American Students
(reprinted from Dart, 1972, p.52)
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involves purposeful use of your 'mind's eye' to develop
mental pictures or images. At higher levels, it is characterized
by both logical and creative processing of mental images to
solve problems, create new ideas, improve physical skdls, or
even quite tumultuous emotional states, (p.2)
Some research indicates that male students generally score higher than female
students on measures of visual/spatial thinking. The researchers attribute this
to the type of environment in which boys grow up (McCormack, 1988). The
gender factor in visual/spatial thinking is, however, a hotiy debated topic (see
for example Howe & Doody, 1989). If there is a gender factor, some might
speculate that a feminine oriented world view has an underdeveloped Space
universal. However, logico-structuralism suggests other possibilities.
Visual/spatial tests appear to involve linear, Euclidean relationships and shapes.
It would be interesting to test the gender hypothesis using a nonlinear, non
Euclidean visual/spatial test. The results of such an investigation might
indicate that the gender factor reported in some research is an artifact of the
researchers' world view, rather than an accurate assessment of visual/spatial
thinking.14 Consider the example of Japanese scientists studying the behavior
of wdd monkeys:
To most observers, all monkeys look very much alike, and
it is difficult to identify individuals in a group. Therefore,
most Western fieldworkers catch the animals and mark them
with numbers. The Japanese, however, became acquainted
with the faces, general appearance, and personalities of the
monkeys, and succeeded in identifying individuals not by
numbers but by giving them names of popular and traditional
figures from Japanese history. (Watanabe, 1974, p.281)
Something quite similar could no doubt be said of Jane Goodall and her work
with chimpanzees, or Dian Fossey and her work with gorillas. The abdity to
distinguish individual monkey, chimp, or gorilla faces involves mental imaging,
but imaging quite different from what is required to visual lines and angles.
One could thus hypothesize that women's visual/spatial thinking should be
"There are a two studies of particular interest in the literature concerning world views in
collision. One is Derek Freeman's (1983) analysis of Margaret Mead's famous work in Samoa
(1928). Freeman contends that Mead's findings were in error and that she found exactly what
she wanted to find based on her own world view. The second example is Marvin Olaslcy's study
of the journalistic coverage of the Scopes trail (1986). Olasky contends that the reporters who
went to Dayton had a world view quite different than the residents of Dayton. As a result, "they
incorrectly portrayed the evolution-creation debate as a battle between intelligence and stupidity
and, as a result, the stereotypes they created persist today."
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conceptualized differendy from what is now typically done in visual/spatial
research.15 Spacial studies testing the recall of complete photographs or
pictures, or recall of colors and color relationships would be interesting.
Time: Time is a more complicated structure. Within a world view
Time can have one of three basic orientations, past, present, or future, each of
which is a different first-order presupposition. Historically there has been a
strong future orientation among Anglo Americans, traceable in part to Puritan
and Calvinistic influences in colonial America. Success in American education
generally requires such an orientation. Kearney noted that a future orientation
is "compatible with scholastic achievement in that such a student is more able
to resist immediate distractions and focus energies toward...good grades,
degrees, etc." (1984, p.95).
Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) noted that Hispanic people are more
present-oriented, in contrast to the future-orientation of many Anglos. The
here and now is more real than anything that may happen tomorrow. A world
view Time universal can also be past-oriented. Kluckhohn and Strodbeck cited
the Chinese and Mormons as examples. Time oriented to the past is
manifested in ancestor worship by the Chinese and the Mormon interest in
genealogies "by which they attempt to discover spiritual links with unknown
ancestors" (Kearney, 1984, p.97).
In addition to orientations of time, there are different images of time.
Some people have an oscillating image of time where time either runs in
circles or zig-zags. According to Kearney:
The essential feature of this image of time is that time is
seen as rhythmically swinging back and forth between
recurrent markers. Such an image occurs most strongly in
technologically simple preliterate societies. (1984, p.99)
Alternatively, the image of time can be linear, like a timeline that a history
teacher might use. Time moves from the past into the present and on into the
future, one-way and irreversible. Since time past cannot be recovered, and the
present also wdl soon be gone, it behooves one to look to time yet to come.
In other words, "a linear image of time is structurally compatible with a future
orientation" (Kearney, 1984, p.101). The co-occurrence of these first order
presuppositions is common in the West and can be traced back through the
Judeo-Christian tradition to the early Hebrews. In Genesis there is a specific
"This hypothesis could be based on women's quite different relationship with nature, as
reported by some researchers, e.g., Halpin (1989).
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creation event at which time starts. It proceeds dirough Jewish history looking
toward die coming of Messiah. The Christian tradition adopted the Jewish
sense of history, except that for Christians time points toward the second
coming of Messiah and the culmination of all time (Glover, 1984). These first
order presuppositions in the Time universal formed an important distinction
between the Medieval world view and the world view of Classical Greece and
Rome. They were crucial for the development of modern science in Europe
(see Foster, 1934; Klaarcn, 1977).
In the research literature student concept of time is not an issue that
has received much attention. Without a world view mcdel such as logico-
structuralism there has been 1itile to draw attention to the possible influence
of time concepts on science learning. The readily visible cultural differences
between Thailand and Japan did lead Mori, Kitagawa & Tang (1974) to
address the issue of time orientation in a school setting. Time is nonlinear in
Buddhist oriented, Thai culture. In Japanese Christian and secular cultures, a
linear concept of time predominates. The researchers observed Thai and
Japanese children who were attending school where scientific concepts of time
were taught. The researchers found schooling to influence the time concepts
of many of the children in the study, but not all. Further investigations of
this type, only informed by world view concepts, would be both interesting
and profitable. For example, one could ask whether there are differences in
other world view categories dtat would help explain why some children's
sense of time was influenced by schooling while others not16
Attributes of Time: In addition to the orientation and image
presuppositions in the Time universal, tfiere are important attributes (Kearney,
1984, pp. 102-106). Time can vary in depth or range. For example, the future
can be a few months, a few years, a few decades, or far more. One likely
consequence is that short-range planning is preferred by those who have
shorter futures. Another attribute is pace. For some people time walks; for
others, it runs. If it runs, there is a greater need for the precise measurement
of time. Furthermore, faster time generally occurs in a world view along with
linear and future-oriented time.
it has been mentioned that a future orientation serves a student well.
In the science classroom, time has lurdier importance. The methods of
science are such that time has a very specific meaning and is used with great
precision. One can easily see how a student's non-scientifically compatible
notion of time would be challenged in a science classroom. For some
"See Logan and O'Hearn (1982) for a nonempirical discussion of the effect of sense of
time on science learning.
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students, that challenge may result in confusion or even render meaningless
many aspects of science.
At this point one might suggest that the universals Space and Time
are actually no more than attributes or characteristics of the NonSelf.
Certainly, Space and Time are always thought of in conjunction with some
aspect of the NonSelf. However, unlike the attribute real/unreal, some
fundamental form of space/time cognition is common to all people (Kearney
1984, pp.89-92). Note that in Figure 4 (p.43), Causality is bracketed by the
universal Relationship on one side, and Time and Space on the other. One's
understanding of Causality is dependent upon both the relationship between the
Self and NonSelf, and upon our understanding of Space and Time. These four
universals are intimately related in that only with some concept of space and
time, in conjunction with some concept of how one relates to the external
world, does a sense of Causality become conceivable (1984, pp.89-107).
To conclude this section recall that the primary difficulty with the
Boasian and Redfield world view traditions was oversimplification. Their
approaches did not facilitate analytical research, and were primarily used for
description. Even at that, the configurationahst approach to world view
glosses over many differences. There is some truth in the statement that the
Western world view is mechanistic (Pepper, 1942), but there are many degrees
of mechanism and many interactions with other factors. Kearney's theoretical
model with its seven interacting universals, provides the analytical tool for
studying subde, intra world view variations, without sacrificing the ability to
draw broad generalizations about world view in a society. Similarities in the
Causality universal may lead one to agree with Pepper that the West has a
mechanistic orientation. However, the logico-structural model with its six
other universals keeps one from glossing over substantial intra-world view,
subculture variation.
62
CHAPTER 5
Science, Science Education and World View
Darwin's twilight lament: I have said that in one respect my
mind has changed during the last twenty or thirty years. Up
to the age of thirty, or beyond it, poetry of many kinds...gave
me great pleasure, and even as a schoolboy I took intense
delight in Shakespeare...I have also said that formerly pictures
gave me considerable, and music very great, delight But now
for many years 1 cannot endure to read a line of poetry: I
have tried to read Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably
dull that it nauseated me. I have also almost lost my taste for
pictures or music... I retain some taste for fine scenery, but
it does not cause me the exquisite delight which it formerly
did... My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for
grinding general laws out of large collections of facts ...
(quoted in Owens, 1983, p.38)
CHAPTER 5
The possibility and definition of a scientific world view must be
addressed before going on to consider how world view, and logico-
structuralism in particular, can effectively be used in science education
research. The preceding pages alluded to the fact that a world view is not
usually associated with an individual. Rather, one might think of an ethnic
group and, for example, speak of the Navajo world view (Witherspoon, 1974).
Or one associates world view with civilizations, religions, and eras (see
Quigley, 1979). Again, as previously mentioned, one might speak of a
Western world view, an Eastern world view, or a Medieval world view. Of
immediate interest is that educators speak of a scientific world view.
The Growth of Science
What is called the modern scientific world view is a uniquely Western
phenomenon born out of the intellectual tumult of the 16th, 17th, and 18th
Centuries in Europe. With the rise of Newtonianism, a mechanistic ideology
triumphed among the European literati over its competitors, the Aristotelian
"world as an organism" view, and the Neo-Platonic "mysterious universe" view
(H. Kearney, 1971). The triumphant mechanistic view exemplified by the
philosophical arguments of Rene Descartes and die experimental work of
Newton and Boyle became the basis of modern science. This mechanistic
view is essentially rcductionistic, the explanation of the whole to be found in
the parts. In this view machine-type analogies are considered appropriate for
explaining natural phenomena. For example, in B.F. Skinner's studies of
human behavior he quite bluntly wrote, "Man is a machine" (1971, p.202).
And though modern physics is modifying the mechanistic, scientific view, it
remains a thoroughly empirical view that stresses the importance of testable
hypotheses concerning natural causes within a lawful universe.
These remarks are about intellectual history but bear an obvious
relationship with the history of science, a discipline that can hardly be
broached without some comment on Kuhn's seminal work The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1970). With regard to the present topic, it is indeed true
that Kuhn used the term world view in reference to the scientific paradigms
he was discussing (p.111). It has already been pointed out that people
frequendy use the term world view where the world that they have in mind
is something considerably less than a totality. The worlds that Kuhn had in
mind are the disciplines of science. Thus, for example, in the world of the
biological sciences, Theodosius Dobznasky can say, "nothing makes sense in
biology except in the light of evolution" (1973, p.125), implying that
evolutionism is the world view or paradigm of biology. If biology is a world,
it is a world within other worlds; and so the evolutionism that is being called
the world view of biology is in fact only one aspect of a much larger world
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view - the world view of the culture in which a biologist lives. Kuhnian
paradigms are themselves grounded in world view.
The world view of Europeans founded on Greco-Roman and Judeo-
Christian traditions, provided the context in which the new scientific thinking
developed (Glover, 1984). In turn, the new scientific thinking strongly
influenced the European, later to be the Western, world view.12 For example,
by the mid 18th Century, the European sense of what it meant to be civilized
had to do with proper social behavior, that is, etiquette and manners.
Europeans found their distinctiveness in religion, political concepts, and
physical appearance. However, in the 19th century, a civdized society was
one that had attained a certain level scientific and technological achievement;
and,
the European's scientific oudook and capacity for invention
were more and more frequently cited as the basic attributes
that set them off form all other peoples. (Adas, 1989, p. 194)
Over the decades, the influence of scientific thinking substantially closed the
gap separating the world view of the people and the ideology of the literati to
such an extent that some in the 20th Century apply the label of mechanism to
the Western world view in toto (e.g., Pepper, 1942; Radhakrishnan, 1967).3
In modern, Western education the development of a scientific world
view is frequently given as a primary goal of science education. However, if
world view refers to epistemological macrostructure, problems begin to surface.
Do educators really wish to advocate that all of experience should be seen
through the eyes of science? Probably not, recognizing that there are valid
non-science related aspects of life and experience. If everyone were to accept
a reductionistic, physio-chemical view of Man, one might well come to agree
'An understanding of people and culture requires that one distinguish the ideology of an elite
few from the cultural idiom of the day, i.e., the world view of the people. See Sewell (1985) and
Skocpol (1985).
^or example, see Adas (1989), The Machine as the Measure of Man. This is a highly
informative account of how European science and technology influenced European estimation of
the essential uniqueness of European culture, and how this estimation was used to assess the value
of non-western cultures.
'Mechanism is a pejorative term in many quarters of academic work. This is largely because
mechanism has become synonymous with mechanistic world view. The term becomes less
troublesome when it is understood that the profitable use of mechanistic concepts in research does
not necessitate a world view dominated by such concepts. For an excellent historical account of
mechanism'see Dijksterhuis (1986).
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with Radhakrishnan, "the modern mechanistic societies lack the vision of self
in man...disintegration becomes the key image of the modem world" (1967,
p.145). It would be more appropriate to argue that education should foster
presuppositions that allow for the possibility of science understanding and
positive attitudes toward science, i.e., a scientifically compatible world view.
The development of a scientifically compatible world view among Western
students is somewhat analogous to the geographical spread of modern, Western
science.
Since its birth the phenomenon of modern, Western science and its
attendant mechanistic view of nature have slowly spread beyond European
borders. In 1967, George Basalla presented a three-stage model that describes
this expansion and growth of science in nonscientific societies. In a new area,
science is at first dependent upon older science and scientists. For example,
American science was for many years dependent upon European science.
Basalla suggested that for the new science to become independent, seven tasks
needed to be completed. The first task and the one most pertinent to the
subject of world view is that a,
resistance to science on the basis of philosophical and
religious behefs must be overcome and replaced by positive
encouragement of scientific research, (p.617)
Given that philosophical and religious beliefs are an important part of the
content of a world view, Basalla is saying in effect that die emergence of an
independent science requires a scientifically compatible world view. The
people of nonscientific, nontechnological (but modernizing) societies often have
world views that are incompatible with scientific thinking. It is not that they
are nonrational, but that their rationality based on a different world view
results in a nonscientific way of thinking (Horton, 1967). For such a society
to develop an independent science, the presuppositional content of the world
view of a significant portion of its people must change. This does not
necessarily mean developing a scientific world view, but a scientifically
compatible world view. The European world view of the 19th Century was
influenced by people of letters such as Goethe, Coleridge and Bums
(especially the romantic protesters against the age of reason), just as it was
influenced by people of science such as Darwin and Maxwell (Randall, 1940).
In the late 20th Century, strong traditional cultures in Japan and India coexist
with the rising of modem science. Yet in the West, society struggles to
escape the scientism promulgated by the like of H.B.S. Haldane:
until the scientific point of view is generally adopted, our
civilization will continue to suffer from a fundamental
disharmony. Its material basis is scientific, its intellectual
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framework is pre-scientific. The present state of the world
suggests that unless a fairly vigorous attempt is made in the
near future to remedy this disharmony, our particular type of
civilization will undergo the fate of the cultures of the past.
(quoted by Hedrick, 1989, p.332)
The point is, an independent, prosperous science must have cultural support,
but docs not require scientific hegemony of culture and inteUecL
The Scientific World View?
In the final decade of the 20th Century the task of modem education
in any society is influenced by the extent of science compatibility within a
society's world view. Figure #8 graphically represents world views in modem
and pre-modern societies, given the assumption that one can accurately des
cribe a collection of world view variants by the theme modem. Consider as
examples, the United States and a non-western, modernizing society (assume
equal population sizes). The X-axis represents a hypothetical scale of world
view compatibility with scientific thinking. The Y-axis represents the
hypothetical frequencies of scientifically compatible world views in the two
example societies. The implicauon of Figure #8 is that a primary task of
modem education in a modernizing nation is shifting the distribution of world
/t\
Pre Modern Society Modern Society
">
Decreasing i ncreasing
Scientifically Oriented Thinking
Fig. 8. Frequency of Scientifically Orienttd Thinking within Two World Vtews
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view variations sufficiently toward scientific compatibility to allow that society
to sustain an independent science (Dart, 1971 & 72).45
At first one might think that the world view frequency distribution for
a modem, scientifically compatible society such as the United States would be
drawn with less variation. However, the United States is a pluralistic nation,
and is becoming more so. For example, a high school in Houston is reported
to have 87 nationalities represented in its student body (Wilson, 1988).
Furthermore, it is likely that the historic American subcultures of African-
Americans, Native American Indians, and women contribute to the variabdity
depicted in Figure #8, since all are underrepresented among science studenLs
and in science-related occupations (Behringer, 1985; Haukoos, 1986; Hueftie,
Rakow & Welch, 1983; Malcom, George & Matyas, 1985; Vetter & Babco,
1988).6 One can surmise that other factors exert a strong influence on the
world view variations of these historic subcultures. Contributions to national
variability must also come from subcultures transplanted in the United States
from nonscientific societies. Furthermore, throughout the whole of American
society there is significant interest in decidedly unscientific practices such as
asu-ology (Eve & Harrold, 1986; Good, 1989). Taken together, this suggests
world view variation even within what is typically considered a modem,
scientific society.
Many would argue that the educational task in the United States the
task is to move the distribution center in Figure #8 further to the right, while
simultaneously reducing heterogeneity. In other words these advocates wish
to see the general character of American thinking become more scientific with
fewer occurrences of nonscientific thought. This goal presupposes that for
instructional purposes one can describe the contours of a scientific world view.
4Some may wish to argue that modern and western education can refer to different systems
of education on the basis that education for the 21st Century does not have to be western in
culture. However, when anyone speaks of modern education it usually is in reference to systems
adopted from the West. It may be argued that given today's world situation modem is by
definition western. This, however, is changing. In the next few years, one will see Japan
emerge as a truly modern state that is distinctively eastern.
*To speak of modern education in a modernizing society in no way implies that this is the
only type of education in such societies. In all states, even in the West, there exists very rich,
traditional education (see for example Hill, 1972). For interesting accounts of the traditional base
of what we now term modern, western education see Nakosteen (1964) and Riche (1976).
This is not meant to imply an ideology of cultural pluralism that assumes each group to have
its own, homogeneous world view, let alone homogeneous, group social and political views, for
example. See Chavez (1990).
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It further presupposes that this described, scientific world view is in fact best
for American society and culture.
One is immediately confronted with a difficult question. What is this
thing being called, the scientific world view? At the philosophical level there
is no clear answer. This is evident from the lively debates in science
education over the nature and philosophy of science. Consider for example
Martin et al. (1988, 1990) who took to task those who believe science ought
to be taught authentically. Martin et al. identify the problem. The term
authentic science, as with most professional jargon, means different things to
different people. Different people also have different concepts of the scientific
world view. The only way to avoid the conclusion that there is actually more
than one scientific world view is to employ the distinction between lived and
articulated world views. This distinction allows one to hold that while
phdosophical, ideological and theological claims, for example, lead people to
different articulations of a scientific view of the world, these people have in
common a subset of lived presuppositions necessary for science. If these
could be identified they might then be incorporated as goals of instruction,
especially early childhood education.
Others, however, view these differences within the scientific
establishment as so many variations on a single theme. While accepting the
notion that there exists a scientifically important subset of presuppositions
within the established scientific world view, they object that science as it is
currenUy viewed by the majority of scientists and taught by the majority of
science teachers promulgates a prejudiced view of science, people and the
world. These objectors fall into two camps loosely related by a common
critique of the Western, mechanistic world view. They find the Western world
view to be excessively pragmatic because only material achievement is
considered significant They find it excessively empiricist because the only
reality is physical reality. It is excessively scientistic because of the exalted
position given to mechanistic understanding. It is exploitive because of the
callous treatment of nature and humanity for material gain. And finally, the
Western world view is elitist because the gain is for the few and not the
many.7
Of the two camps, the feminist camp is the more widely known. The
feminist camp specifically charges that science is not only a bastion of male
activity, but that the entire edifice of science presupposes male psychology and
male dominance. According to Sandra Harding:
'These emphasized adjectives are borrowed from Henryk Skolimowski (1974, p.53) who uses
them in his critique of progress as related to a scientific world view.
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[Science] is inextricably connected with specifically mas
culine...needs and desires. Objectivity vs. subjectivity, the
scientist as knowing subject vs. the objects of his inquiry,
reason vs. the emotions, mind vs. body - in each case the
former has been associated with masculinity and the latter
with femininity. In each case it has been claimed that human
progress requires the former to dominate the latter. (1986,
p.23)
Harding thus wishes to see the complete reconstruction of the extant scientific
world view (as she interprets it) in a feminist mode (Coughlin, 1984; Keller,
1985, Harding & O'Barr, 1987).8
The second camp, arguably related to the feminist camp (see
Perreault, 1979; Bazin, 1982), is the Eastern mysticism camp based on the
work of Berkeley physicist Fritjof Capra (1977; also see, Capra &
Steenbergen, 1985). Capra observed that although physics has traditionally
been known as the "hardest of the 'hard' sciences" (1977, p.21), it is modem
physics that leads to mysticism. According to Capra, the Eastern mystical,
scientific world view:
may be characterized by words like 'organic,' 'holistic,' or
'ecological,' since it regards all phenomena in the universe
as integral parts of an inseparable, harmonious whole...all
things and events...are interrelated and are but different
aspects or manifestations of the same ultimate reality...the
cosmos is seen as one inseparable reality-forever in motion,
alive, organic, spiritual and material at the same time. (1977,
pp.21&22)
While Capra's ideas may not be popular in the scientific and educational
establishments, they are very appealing to animal rights activists, radical
environmentalists, and followers of New Age philosophies. Given the
environmental difficulties currently facing society, this view of reality is more
likely to gain adherents than lose.
There is a third camp to be consider, though not a camp to be
thought of as objectors. This is the camp of theistic realists, or theistic
critical reahsts. This camp does not seek to reconstruct science in some new
form, but to support both natural and theological science while at the same
time curbing scientism. The eminent Barthian theologian, T.F. Torrance, in a
"For an opposing feminist view, see Margarita Levin (1988).
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passage concerning Einstein, commented on the relationship between natural
and theological science:
science is quite unable through demonstration...to provide the
basic belief in the objective rationality of the universe or the
aspiration toward truth and understanding which it clearly
requires. Without profound faith of this kind, which conies
from religion and revelation, science would be inconceivable.
However, science itself has a religious dimension in which
it contributes toward a religious spiritualization of our under
standing of life, if only through the humble attitude of mind
toward the grandeur of reason incarnate in existence...what is
intended here is not that theology should take into its material
content ideas derived from natural scientific knowledge...any
more dian natural science should incorporate into its devel
oping stock of ideas distincdy theological conceptions...what
is envisaged here is an exercise in conjoint thinking. (1981,
pp.7&8)
On a more personal level, distinguished physicist Carl Friedrich von
Weizsacker, discussing what as a youth drew him to science, wrote:
The experience of such a night cannot be described in words;
I can only give the residual thoughts after the memory has
faded. God was present, somehow, in the indescribable
magnificence of that starry night Concurrendy, I was aware
that stars are balls of gas consisting of atoms and obeying
the laws of physics. The tension between these two truths
must not be unresolvable. But how could they be reconciled?
Is it possible to find die reflection of the glory of God also
in the laws of physics? (1988, p.l)'
Other representatives of this camp are Thorsen (1978), Peacocke (1981, 1986),
Jaki (1986), and Ratzsch (1986).10
*von Weizsacker was a student and associate of Werner Heisenberg, and from 1979 to 1980,
the Director of the Max Plank Institute.
*Good sources of material on theistic realism are Perspectives on Science and
Christian Faith, the journal of the American Scientific Affiliation, and Zygon, the journal of
the Center for the Advanced Study of Religion and Science,
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Practicing Western scientists may be found in all three of these
camps. Of more importance for education is that these three camps represent
significant portions of Western society that cannot be swept aside with impu
nity. This is not to say that the views found in these camps are equally valid.
Rather, one can persist in speaking of the scientific world view only by
ignoring the variation both within the science establishment, and also the
variation represented by these camps.
Scientifically Compatible World Views
Difficulties with the concept of scientific world view are encountered
precisely because any articulation of a scientific world view is a
configurationahst or thematic statement, which in fact provides very little
information about the people who purportedly hold such views. Nor is much
gained by substituting mechanistic for scientific. One still has a monolithic
view that glosses over substantial differences, such as the differences between
the scientists B.F. Skinner (1971) the mechanic and Fritjof Capra (1982) the
mystic; between Carl Sagan (1985) the secularist and John Polkinghorne
(1983) the Christian.11 Furthermore, a monolithic view is meaningless in the
face of radically divergent views such as feminist science. Earlier it was
commented that one may more profitably refer to scientifically compatible
world views. Using the logico-structural model of world view it becomes
possible to speak of world views that are actually quite different, yet
scientifically compatible. In this way of thinking, world view variations can
be seen to accommodate divergent scientists such as Sagan and Polkinghorne;
as well as to provide a structure for evaluating radical world view claims
against the practice of science.
Implicit in the logico-structural position that world view is a com
posite of seven integrated universal categories, is the possibility of many world
views; and even more world view variations or variants, which also vary in
degree of scientific compatibility.12 Consider most any American scientist and
most any Indian scientist, such as C.V. Raman.13 While one may be tempted
to say that they both have the scientific world view, in fact their world views
"Until 1979, Polkinghorne was a distinguished, mathematical physicist at the University of
Cambridge. He is now an Anglican curate.
"Configurationalist scholars typically speak of fewer than ten, distinct world views. See for
example, Pepper (1942) or Smart (1983).
"C. V. Raman was the Indian physicist at the Indian Association for Cultivation of Science,
Calcutta, who won the 1928 Nobel Prize in physics for the discovery that bean hit name, the
Raman Effect (Bhargava &. Chakrabarti, 1989).
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will be quite different (at both lived and articulated levels). This is Ulustrated
by the frequency distributions in Figures #9 and #10.
/N
Scientists: Indian ana American
Presuppositions and Attributes Pertinent to Science
Fig. 9. Frequency of Americans and Indians on a Science World View Scale
Assume for the sake of argument what educators tend to take for granted, that
there are world view presuppositions and attributes pertinent to science.
Figure #9 depicts what one could reasonably predict a frequency distribution
of the general Indian and American populations on a hypothetical measure of
these pertinent presuppositions and attributes to look like. The scientists both
appear far to the right indicating the presence, in their individual world views,
of these science related presuppositions and attributes. This is what one would
expect. By this indicator the two scientists are simdar, and many would thus
say they have the scientific world view.
Now consider Figure #10. This is a hypothetical frequency distribu
tion of general American and Indian populations on a hypothetical measure of
Eastern presuppositions and attributes. This time, reasonable prediction places
the American scientist on the left along with the majority of Americans,
scientist or not. Whde elements of the American scientist's world view may
be similar to elements of an Eastern world view, this is a reasonable
placement because overall the American scientist is a Westerner. The Indian
scientist however, is reasonably placed to the right reflecting an Eastern
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background (MacCormac, 1988). It may well be that the Indian scientist's
scientific training has changed some of his or her Indian presuppositions. To
the extent that this has happened, the Indian scientist may fall more to the left
of his or her compatriots in Figure #10.M Nevertheless, a significant
difference would still remain between the two scientists.
A\
American Scientist ndian Scientist
>
Esstern Presuppositions and Attributes
Fig. 10. Frequency of Americans and Indians on an Eastern World View Scale
According to the logico-structural model, a single scientific world
view is not to be expected. There wtfl be presuppositional content within the
seven, world view Dniversais that is fairly constant across a group of people
considered to have a scientific point of view. For example, it is likely that
these people hold the NonSelf presupposition:
that the things and events in the universe occur in consistent
patterns that are comprehensible through careful, systematic
study. (AAAS, 1989, p.25)
This is content pertinent to the enterprise of science. There will also be
''Assuming the rather ethnocentric, but reasonable position that in general western views are
more scientifically oriented.
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content differences. For example, Indian and American scientists are likely to
have quite divergent views on religion, philosophy, and social relationships.
Depending on cultural background, differences may be rather large, as is likely
between Indian and American scientists. Differences may also be rather small,
as is likely between scientists from different American or different Indian
subcultures. This kind of differentiation implies that it is more accurate to say
that an American scientist has a scientifically compatible variant of an
American world view. Likewise, an Indian scientist has a scientifically
compatible variant of an Indian world view. The distinction between world
view and world view variation, or variant, of a world view may be likened to
the distinction between language and dialect
Confronting Variation
The Nature of Science: This variation among scientists noted above raises
the first in a series of critical questions.
1. Given the considerable variation among
scientists due to the many cultures in which
they live, what are the essential presuppo
sitions and attributes of a scientifically com
patible world view?
The universality of patterns in nature has already been given as an example
of a presupposition necessary in science. The world view of Collingwood's
pathologist provides a second example, this one of a presupposition in the
Causahty universal necessary for a world view to be scientifically compatible.
The presupposition is that all effects, E, have causes, C.15 This presupposition
is modified by an interaction with a presupposition in the Classification
universal, i.e., there are different classes of cause. The pathologist
undoubtedly recognizes several classes and to these classes he wdl apply
attributes such as usage. Because he is a pathologist one can be sure that of
the various classes of cause he assumes always to exist, he considers some to
be appropriate for science and others not. Eventually this avenue of reasoning
leads to an informational level where the pathologist has stored knowledge of
specific causes for specific effects, e.g., virus X causes disease Y. This is a
much narrower, more defined level of epistemological structure than the level
of world view universals. The work on meaningful learning by Novak (1977)
l*Thi« understanding of cause and effect is based ondyadics, the assumption that in essence
there is only one kind of natural event in the world, "the mutual action between two things"
(Percy, 1989, p.81). Percy's essay is a good introduction to this aspect of the western, science-
influenced world view. Also see the works of Charles Sanders Pierce.
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and Ausubei (1963) concerns epistemological structures at this level of an
individual's total mental framework. However, a scientifically compatible
world view does not require the lower, informational levels (e.g., that virus X
causes disease Y). It only requires that presuppositions and attributes be in
place so that when specific information is confronted, such as the effects of
viruses, the information will be meaningful. In this case, one would say that
compatibdity requires an appropriate notion of cause.
While the above example speaks of science knowledge, it could as
well have been science processes, or what is often called scientific thinking.
Briefly, in the universal Relationship, Collingwood's pathologist has
presuppositions concerning ways of knowing. These interact with
Classification presuppositions resulting in some categories of knowing
appropriate for science, and others not The knowledge that scientific ways
of knowing involve empirical observation, theory, and experiment will be
related to presuppositions in science pertinent categories.
The nature of science, which is of major interest among science
educators, is closely related to this question concerning the presuppositions and
attributes of a scientifically compatible world view. Science education
research relevant to the nature of science (e.g., Kimball, 1967), relies heavily
on works in the philosophy of science. As researchers seek a better
understanding of the concept of a scientifically compatible world view, world
view theory will require that they become more involved with studies in the
history and sociology of science (e.g., Barnes & Edge, 1982), and with
feminist and theological studies (e.g., Rosser, 1989, and Polkinghorne, 1983,
respectively). Science educators speak of authentic science in the science
classroom, and science instruction that model science. Science educators
speak of fostering in students a scientific world view, which presumably
means the world view of scientists. However, the point of the preceding
paragraphs is that scientists drawn from the world over do not comprise a
single, homogeneous group of people that can accurately be said to have a
single world view. If that is the case, then the goal of authentic science in
the classroom means that world view study in science education must include
a focus on the world views of scientists in culture* Failing to do so means
pursuing a scientific oudook out of context."
"For example, Hallyn (1990) provides a fascinating account of the heliocentric revolution not
from the stand point of scientific history, but from the cultural context in which Copernicus and
Kepler lived.
"The contextual issue is further addressed on pages 79-87.
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The Nature of Students: World view variation is of course relative. The
differences between any two American scientists are small, as compared to the
differences between an American scientist and an Indian scientist. In
comparing two American scientists one realizes that most American scientists
were bom and raised in America. Most American scientists are white males
from middle class backgrounds. Furthermore, most have had their science
inclinations developed through years of schooling that involved similar science
textbooks and teachers similarly trained (though it must be admitted that the
quality of schooling can vary significandy). The point here is not to in any
way denigrate the people who are American scientists, but to point out that
they comprise a rather homogeneous group relative to scientists world wide.
The world views of American scientists are also rather homogeneous, in
contrast to the world view variations among all high school and college
students. One can reasonably predict that major world view variations stem
from racial, ethnic, gender, and religious differences, as well as from
economic class, geography, and family-type differences. The fact that students
bring these world view variations to the science classroom precipitates two
more questions.18
2. Can scientifically neutral presuppositions
and attributes within student world views be
identified?
3. What are the student presuppositions and
attributes that actively hinder scientific
understanding and science attitudes?
The significance of the three questions is that the answers have the potential
to improve educators' understanding of what is and is not a science
misconception, of how commonsense theories develop, to improve the
definitions of appropriate scientific attitudes and improve attitude research
approaches. The potential also exists for a broader, more coherent framework
in conceptual studies.
Teacher Variation: Before leaving the discussion of world view variation, it
is important to note that variation also exists among teachers. Teacher world
view variation, in fact, raises two issues. As alluded to in Chapter 4 (p.55),
teachers employ in their teaching a great variety of analogies, metaphors, and
"For concurring positions, see Hawkins & Pea (1987) and MaUui (1989); however, these
articles differ in that they define culture quite narrowly. For research relevant to the world view
approach advocated here, see Bloom's work on context of meaning (In Press) and Solomon's
work on the social construction of knowledge (1987 & 89).
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explanations. They also make different choices of content. The research in
these areas is largely descriptive. However, world view theory focuses
attention on teacher cultural context. To again use the analogy of singer and
song, it is the study of the singer that allows one to understand the song. As
advocated by Campbell (1988) and Goodson & Walker (1988), understanding
the teacher's life allows for greater understanding of the teacher's behavior in
the classroom.
The second issue concerns the teacher's understanding of science
within the cultural context of the teacher, i.e., within the teacher's personal
world view variant In science education there is a rich hterature on the
nature of science as understood by teachers. The research is generally
quantitative such as the widely cited study by Kimball (1967), and also free
of any contextual interests. More recent research such as Ledbetter (1987)
use the contextually sensitive methods of qualitative research, yet do not
pursue the issues of context. While it is of interest to identify teachers'
different conceptions of science, understanding why these conceptions make
sense to the teachers is of greater importance.
The second issue concerns teacher differential treatment of students.
In her study of social class and school knowledge, Anyon wrote:
When Max Weber and Karl Marx suggested that there were
identifiable and socially meaningful differences in the
educational knowledge made available to literati and peasants
... they were discussing earlier societies. Recent scholarship
in political economy and sociology of knowledge has also
argued, however, that in advanced industrial societies such as
Canada and the U.S., where the class structure is relatively
fluid, students of different social class backgrounds are still
likely to be exposed to qualitatively different types if
educational knowledge. (1981, p.3)"
This allegation is corroborated by a recent article on unintended bias in the
science classroom by Contreras and Lee (1990). One would not wish to over
extend the claims of world view research, but it is reasonable to suspect that
understanding teacher bias will require that teacher behavior be placed in a
rather complete context This context surely includes the teachers' individual
world view variations.
"Also see Page's study (1989) of school culture and teachers' perceptions of students.
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World View as an Educational Goal
It is implicit in the Basalla model discussed earlier in this chapter that
a modem society will seek through education to promote scientific
understanding and ways of thinking. It was noted that this objective bears on
the issue of world view. The preceding sections, however, warn of the
difficulties encountered when one speaks of a scientific world view, let along
the scientific world view. Nevertheless, it is evident that such language is
common in science education. The recent Project 2061 document Science for
All Americans sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science is a good example. This document contains a brief, cogent section on
the nature of science (AAAS, 1989, pp.25-31), which includes a reference to
the scientific world view. Admirable philosophical goals? Yes. World view?
No, a world view is a totality concept People live in cultural (geopolitical,
sociocultural, economic) context. World view presuppositions important to
science are set in a nexus of many presuppositions all having to do with the
varied aspects of one's life in cultural context. The phdosophical view
capsulized by the 1989 AAAS document20 and generally found in the literature
of science education, is the view of a scientific paper, as opposed to the actual
world view of a scientist. Basing his comments on the work of Mahoney
(1976, 1979) and Mitroff and Mason (1974), Gauld wrote:
die real scientist departs considerably from the picture
presented in the science education literature. (1982, p.113, his
emphasis)
He later commented that one the basis of evidence presented one could
conclude,
that development of the scientific attitude in students should
be eliminated as one of the major goals of science education,
and this certainly follows for the attitude as it has been
formulated by science educators for the past 60 years, (p. 118)
What Gauld called the scientific attitude, others call the scientific world view.
The problem, to use Holton's (1952) terminology, is that science education
presents science in its public form, rather than its private form. Or, from the
perspective of world view theory, the scientist of the science paper and of
science education is a scientist out of cultural context, which is to say a
nonperson.
"For other summary pieces on the nature of science, see Gauld (1982); Storer (1966); Barber
(1952); Merton (1968, originally published in 1942).
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As it has often been done, one can decontextualize science on paper,
but not in the flesh. Once the shift is made to a view held by a person, by
definition neither science nor any other philosophy or activity can' be
decontextuahzed. Whatever a person knows, he or she knows in cultural
context Gauld says it is wrong for educators to mold students in the image
of a decontextuahzed scientist because it is a false image. Furthermore, the
myth of a decontextualized science obscures the personal context that an
educator brings to the classroom. Gerard Fourez' excellent article on ideol
ogy and science teaching (1988) provides a good example. Fourez told of a
scientist colleague who insisted "my course is scientific, period." To which
Fourez rejoined, "science classes, like every other teaching situation, carry
ideas, values, projections, and worldviews" (p.269). Fourez' colleague perhaps
did not wish to admit it, but there is no such thing as a course that is
"scientific, period."
Consider a more recent example. In a critque of Lawson (1988),
Bloom & Borstid (1990) observed that:
empirical research is being advanced on a value premise that
is essentially buried. Nowhere does Lawson argue why we
should "overthrow" children's alternative conceptions about
science and "implant" scientific ideas, (p.400, emphasis
added)
Fourez would concur. The perspective from world view concurs. However,
in Lawson's rejoinder, he says the reason he did not discuss "why" should be
obvious:
I aim to teach science. Science consists of a set of
procedures for acquiring knowledge plus the knowledge that
has been acquired. Scientifically valid knowledge is hard to
come by. Do Bloom and Borstad really want us to teach
invalid knowledge? (1990), p.406)
Given the opportunity, Bloom and Borstad might well respond: It is should be
obvious that this is not a matter of valid versus invalid knowledge, but of
which validated knowledge, and thus the significance of the question why.
Evidence of a teacher's context is not difficult to find. It can be seen
in Lawson's rejoinder. Or, consider the following passage concerning the
strength of scientific explanation:
what we know of the origin of species from Darwin's work
is a triumph of scientific materialism: neither supernatural
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mysteries nor explanations peculiar to biological science are
needed; just 'simple' deductive logic, and appropriate
empirical verification. Needless to say, the simple logic of
Darwin's explanation is the simplicity of genius. (Gough,
1978, p.6)
Like Fourez' colleague and Lawson, this teacher would also say "my course
is scientific, period." The teacher's protestations not withstanding, it is clear
that Gough's comments extend beyond the pale of science into metaphysics.
His very words (e.g., scientific materialism, just simple deductive logic) betray
the influence of his personal world view on his understanding of science.
Among scientists, some would share his view, but others would not
Gough and Fourez' colleague hold a common view. They believe
they know what it means to have a scientific world view; and, they believe
many student world views need to be exchanged for this scientific world view.
According to Brunkhorst and Yager:
students seem to internalize their experiences with the real
world. The misconceptions they hold come from real world
experiences; such experiences are the basis for their world
view, vis-a-vis the world as they have seen or experienced it.
When this view is in conflict with science of textbooks and
school, students either reject the school science...or play the
school game...but retain their experience-based explanations.
Science teaching/learning becomes dogma, (something to be
accepted without question and/or real understanding). (1986,
p.369)
This passage correcdy identifies the basis of a student's world view in
everyday experience, but it goes on to imply that such a world view is often
unsatisfactory. Experience based world views need to be replaced by a school
mediated, scientific world view. But what is this replacement view? Is it
Gough's scientific materialism? According to Smolicz and Nunan (1975), the
school mediated, scientific world view frequendy refers to:
the anthropocentric view (man as conqueror and controller of
nature through science), the principle of quantification and
demystification (science as a rational process for obtaining
quantitative information about the world), the positivisdc faith
(faith in the continued advance of technology through applica
tion of scientific method) and the analytic ideal (the assump
tion that the whole is best understood by a study of its
component parts), (quoted in Hodson 1985, p.27)
CHAPTER 5
Nadeau and Desautels (1984), Hodson (1985), and Duschl (1988) all basically
concur. Regardless of how students feel about their science instruction, as
noted by Brunkhorst and Yager, many students know how to play the school
game. They get through a science course by accepting science as dogma, i.e.,
"something to be accepted without question and/or real understanding" (p.369).
It is evident that many students, actually being very wise, fail to find the view
point of science, as it is described above, superior to their own personal,
experience-based view points. And thus, the National Science Board laments
the sorry state of scientific literacy in the U.S. (Good, 1989).
There is litde debate that people are well served by a good under
standing of science. There is also litde debate that the public image of
science is in need of repair:
to say that public support for science ebbs and flows is to
misrepresent the depth of popular ambivalence and anxiety
about scientists and what they do. When science is not being
blamed for threatening the very existence of the globe, it is
accused of despoiling nature and dehumanizing mankind; with
technology. (Gerbner, 1987, p.109)
There is no lasting bliss in ignorance, and so there is no debate that education
involves the development, and sometimes the change, of student behefs. It
would be hypocritical if a teacher did not believe his or her behefs to be
essentially correct.21 What one teaches about photosynthesis is what one
believes to be true about photosynthesis.22 Photosynthesis is a specific topic
and a benign one at that The more important issue is a teachers' personal
contextuahzation of science in general, and the sense of science that
subsequendy infuses the classroom. This issue of contextualization prompts
four more critical questions.
4. To what extent is the teacher aware of the
context of science being promulgated in his.
or her classroom?
5. What is the teacher's context i.e., the
beliefs and presuppositions?
J1For a good discussion on the ethics of teaching behefs, see Degenhardt (1986).
"The word true is not used in the sense of absolute truth, but in the senile that something
is valid, essentially correct.
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6. To what extent is this context essential for
science? (refer to question #1, p.75)
7. What contexts do the students bring to the
classroom, and how do these interact with
the teacher's context? (refer to questions #3
& 4, pp.77&82)
The teacher, however, who asserts "I teach science and nothing but science!"
is contextuaily blind, and will have no use for these questions. Ledbetter
(1987) and Matsui (1989) concur. Power made the same basic point in 1977:
Teaching and learning must be understood in terms of the
values, purposes and perceptions of die participants, rather
than in terms of constructs deriving from pre-structures,
instrument or psychological theory, (quoted in Solomon, 1987,
p.68)
To further clarify the issue of world view and context, consider
Figures #11 and #12, which are an attempt to illustrate the factors impinging
on the sense-making processes of an individual.23 Factors are represented by
embedded boxes. Since world view is totality concept, in each diagram world
view is represented by the most inclusive box. Religion and philosophy are
represented by the second most inclusive boxes. Beyond these levels the
boxes are of about equal size in deference to the difficulty of determining
whether any of these subordinant factors is more inclusive than the others.
The sets of boxes form several hierarchial contexts that impinge on the sense-
making events represented by bold letters. Notice that in Figure #11, there is
nothing that represents science. If this were the representation of a student,
a researcher might find that the student's learning of science, for example, is
hindered by inadequate conceptions of the relationship of force and motion
(e.g., Clement, 1982). Given sufficient self-awareness and gumption, the
student could well respond, "Inadequate says who?" The implication being
that the student's conceptions of force and motion are inadequate only when
removed from the student's personal context.
Of course, it is in everyone's interest that the student gain a scientific
understanding of force and motion. At the present the thrust of science
education is to displace students' commonsense theories and untutored beliefs
^The factors in this illustration are important ones. However, the illustration is hypothetical.
There may well be other factors, such as the influence of formal schooling. Also, the relationships
of these factors may be quite different from what the illustration suggests.
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with scientific conceptions. However, while there is evidence that
commonsense theories impede science learning (e.g., Novak, 1987), there is no
evidence that commonsense views must be removed before science learning
can take place. People typically hold multiple, seemingly contradictory views;
but the individual has an organization that makes personal sense of apparent
contradiction.24 The point of this discussion is that instead of focusing solely
on the student conception, researchers should examine two contextual sets.
There is the student's context which supports the student's conceptions, and
there is the teacher's context in which instruction is couched. Figure #12
represents the goal of contextually sensitive education. Scientific literacy
becomes integrated into the student's world view as an enhancement To have
*Noie in Chapter 1 (pp.6&7), the comment by Boas with regard to alleged primitive thinking.
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an understanding of science that allows the promotion of scientific literacy,
however, involves a third contextual set, the contextual set of scientists. One
is, thus brought back to the seven critical questions listed above.23
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There is in the literature of science education some fine material on
the philosophy of science. Bybee (1990) has recendy commented that the trio
of Duschl's Restructuring Science Education (1990), Martin's Concepts ofScience
Education: A Philosophical View (1972), and Robinson's The Nature of Science
andScience Teaching (1968) provides an excellent philosophical background for
I*This assumes that to start with the student's world view was not inherently incompatible
with science. Inherent incompatibility, admittedly presents a much more difficult situation.
Nevertheless, a contextually sensitive approach would still be in order.
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studies in science education. The Project 2061 document (AAAS, 1989)
previously noted is also a fine addition to the literature in science education.
What is lacking is the socio-cultural dimension. It is to the credit of the
science education community that in recent years educators and researchers
have engaged in a vigorous reexamination of the goals for science education.
The result is newer goals that are more phdosophically sound, and are more
contextually sensitive. There is a significant, emerging understanding of the
importance of viewing science in social context. Scientifically literate citizens
are ones,
who understand how science, technology, and society
influence one another and who are able to use this knowledge
in their everyday decision making. (Koballa, undated, p.33)
To further strengthen this definition of literacy it should be made clear that
society includes culture, that science exists in a cultural context, and that there
are significant science-cu/mra/ interactions. Dart has gone so far as to suggest
that for some students science should be taught as a "second culture" much
the same way that non-English speaking students are taught English as a
second language (1972). The second culture approach is a contextually
sensitive approach. It suggests that science education should help students see
that science is another powerful way of viewing the world, and that in certain
circumstances it is a necessary way.
Return now to Figure #8, the original point of departure for this
lengthy discussion. The American educational task is not necessarily to move
the distribution center further to the right, and it is even less the task to
reduce heterogeneity. American pluralism is a great source of vitality and
attempts at drastically reducing pluralism are likely to be both futile and
counter productive.26 The notion of a scientific world view is inherendy
ambiguous and ideologically laden, and therefore suspect as a goal of
education in a democratic society. However, education can enhance and
enrich student world views, in much the same way that learning a second
language can be an enriching experience. The task is not so much to change
world view as it is to budd bridges of understanding between the enterprise
of science and the world view variations held by students. To this end an
examination of the non-western studies on teaching science as a second culture
"Excessive pluralism does create severe problems. In 1990, while the: U.S.A. it a pluralistic
nation, with but minor exceptions the schools have not yet been confronted with extreme world
view diversity. Furthermore, the historical growth of science and the influence that science
historically has had on western culture suggests that the process of learning science, even as a
second culture, will quite naturally exert an homogenizing influence on student world views.
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is perhaps a worthy project. In the meantime, one may actually be thankful
that science education as found by Smolicz and Nunan (1975), has not been
more successful. One should be glad that not too many students have come
to share Darwin's twilight lament
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World View and Science Education Research
In common with so many others, I used to think that we
could get rid of Bantu 'stupidities' by suitable talks on
natural science, hygiene, etc., as if natural science could
subvert their traditional lore or philosophy. We destroy in this
way their natural sciences, but their fundamental concepts
concerning the universe remain unchanged...(Father Temples,
1959, emphasis added).
It was noted in Chapter 1 that the strength of misconception work is the focus
on student epistemological structure and the interest in working from the
students knowledge to the objective of instruction. There is, however, an
inherent weakness. As Father Temples discovered, students are not stupid.
Students generally prefer ideas that make sense to them regardless of what the
teacher says.
World View and Science Education Research
Application to Misconception Research
The power of the logico-structural model of world view lies in its
research utility for the analysis and understanding of world view variation not
only where there is a prima facie case for such variation, but also within
what is usually considered a single world view group, such as the typical
American classroom. This is most easdy seen in the investigation of students'
untutored behefs, here to fore misconceptions. In a typical piece of research
the investigator might explore students' understanding of the concept ecosystem
by asking students why some organisms consume other organisms in a given
pattern or sequence. The investigator typically labels responses such as "It's
God's purpose," or "Organisms eat other organisms to preserve their species,"
as misconceptions (Marek, 1986). The researcher might then attempt to
displace the alleged misconceptions by employing Ausubelian cognitive
bridges, i.e., the introduction of a lesson using statements intended to connect
new material to what the students already know (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian,
1978). More recent literature argues for the conceptual change approach
(Posner et al., 1982), which involves:
the interaction of new knowledge with existing knowledge in
order that the new may be reconciled with the old. The
process of reconcUiation involves, firsdy, dissatisfaction with
existing conceptions in the light of new information;
secondly, as a consequence of this dissatisfaction,
differentiation of existing conceptions, or even the rejection
of some in favour of others, that is an exchange of
conceptions. In many cases new conceptions may be
integrated with existing conceptions, or different conceptions
integrated with each other. This requires contiguous ideas in
which there is no conflict of meaning or understanding.
(Hewson, 1988, p.323)
The meaningful learning and conceptual change models do help, but to date
research shows the effects to be limited (e.g., Champagne et al., 1985). Based
on world view theory, one can argue that by labeling student beliefs as mis
conceptions one has accepted an oversimplified and distorted notion of student
thinking. Instructional methods thus grounded are inherentiy flawed.
To return to Hawkin's terminology, the science teacher with respect
to student views of the world is confronted with a critical barrier phenomenon:
the product of the interaction between different sets of
intellectual habits or filing systems: those which serve to
animate and organize the knowledge or understanding the
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uninitiated bring with them to instruction, and those which
inform and direct various fields of contemporary scientific
inquiry. (Hills & McAndrews, 1987, p.211)
The conceptual change model attempts to deal with a critical barrier
phenomenon by making the dissonance explicit on the assumption that
students wdl recognize the superiority of the instructed conceptions vis-a-vis
their own untutored behefs or commonsense theories. Hewson (1988) pointed
out that the success of this approach requires that three conditions be met:
intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness (p.324). And,
if the student acquires the scientific conceptions, it is because
the scientific conceptions are seen to be more powerful and
useful in explaining and predicting phenomena. If die student
does not acquire the scientific conception, it could be because
existing conceptions remain more intelligible, plausible and
fruitful for the student, (p.324)1
From the perspective of world view theory, the assertion "it could be" is much
too mild. Rather, a student does not acquire the scientific conceptions
precisely because these are less intelligible, less plausible, and less fruitful
from the student's point of view (Driver et al., 1985). Rummelhart and
Norman suggested that
the learning of a complex topic involves three modes,
accretion ... addition of new information to the learner's
ideas/beliefs about the topic... restructuring... the reorganizing
of ideas/beliefs about the topic... tuning ...refinements resulting
from continued use of ideas/beliefs... (Gunstone, 1988, p.87,
emphases added)
If students can readily relate science instruction to the untutored beliefs they
bring with them to the classroom, approaches such as the conceptual change
model should precipitate the accretion and tuning of knowledge. But what is
intended of the conceptual change model is the very thing it is least able to
do, i.e., precipitate the restructuring of belief. One may summarize by saying
that much of science instruction assumes the very thing it is attempting to
'The exception one may take to Prof. Hewson's comment is that she apparently has made
the acquisition of scientific concepts an either/or issue. The concept of world view presented in
this monograph, in addition to the specific idea of science as a second culture, implies that the
learning of science need not be an either/or issue vis-a-vis other ways of viewing the world.
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bring about2 From the point of world view theory, Clements (1987) use of
anchoring concepts is a more promising instmctional approach because it
allows a more positive role in learning for student ideas. Clements has
achieved a degree on instmctional success by identifying ideas that students
hold that also can serve as points of attachment for new learning.
Reinterpreting Misconception Data
Reconsider the above example of misconception research in which the
researcher investigated students' understanding of the concept ecosystem by
asking them why some organisms consume otherorganisms in a given pattern
or sequence (Marek, 1986). Responses such as "It's God's purpose," and
"Organisms eat other organisms to preserve dieir species," are considered
misconceptions, but are they? These are not the responses of students who
after instruction have just plain got it wrong. Assuming that the students have
responded sincerely, these responses have die appearance of commonsense.
Instead of setting the displacement of the student ideas as the immediate goal,
one should try to understand the student beliefs that support student ideas. A
world view analysis begins by assuming that student responses are meaningful
to the students, if not to the teacher. A logico-structural analysis of die above
example suggests that the responses are indicative of epistemological presup
positions within the world view universals NonSelf, Causality, and Clas
sification. For clarification, consider Figure #13 which is adapted from
Richard Bube's structural diagram of the universe (1971).3 This is a conve
nient way of showing the NonSelf as a composite of categories, or subdomains
(all of which are subject to further subdivision). The first two columns
contain parallel sets of categories, the first column showing more general
terms and the second more specific. The third column shows a corresponding
set of intellectual disciplines. The existence of a category in the NonSelf not
only makes a particular discipline meaningful, but also the concepts of
causality associated with that discipline.
The student who gives "God" as an explanation for a natural pheno
menon does so because there exists important theological categories in the
student's classification of the NonSelf (though this is not to imply that the
student is a self-conscious theologian). One can also assume that the student's
^ewson's (1988) and Toulmin's (1972) work on the ecological context of knowledge is an
avenue that complements well world view theory.
'At one time positivists felt that any explanation, whether it was in biology, psychology, or
economics, could be reduced to a physical explanation. In a recent article on the subject David
Owens argued thatwhile physics has a "certain ontological and causal primacy" this does not give
special sjatus to physical explanations (1989, p.59). Also see McDonald (1989).
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Fig. 13 Categorizing the NonSelf
(adapted from Bube, 1971, p.34)
biological categories are relatively weaker. In contrast, biology instruction
primarily involves the categories of cell, plant and animal. Otiier categories
in Figure #13 may also be involved on occasion, but certainly not theological
categories. In other words, biology instruction is functionally atiieistic.
Furthermore, biology textbooks and classroom teachers typically
employ a rather restricted definition of cause (Kilbourn, 1974).4 The teacher
'This is of course a generalization. There are science teachers with other views of causation,
including religious ones (Dagher & Cossman, 1990). As pointed out in the preceding chapter, such
teacher variation invites world view research.
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and textbook typically say, one can explain (i.e., give the cause) an event E
when one knows that event E occurs only when the material conditions C
occur, where the conditions C are a restricted set of categories within the
NonSelf domain (Ross 1962, p.64). Again, the instruction is functionally
atheistic because the restricted set does not include theological categories
(Kilbourn, 1974; Proper, Wideen & Ivany, 1988).
The student's use of God as an explanation suggests a significant
disjunction between aspects of the student's world view and that which is
projected in the classroom (Pines & West, 1986). A natural, inculturated view
appears to be at odds with a formal, instructional view. The categories of the
NonSelf important to the student are the very ones dehberately shunned in the
classroom. In Aristotehan terms, the student's interest is in final causes, not
the efficient causes of biology instruction. In this world view analysis the
student's response is not at all a misconception, but a meaningful response.
The student's response is a commonsense response based on the student's
epistemological framework. Thus, one is led to a different view of classroom
instmctional failure. The conceptual change model for instruction likely will
fail because the model provides the right answer for the wrong question. The
model fads to help the student see that there is a significant question for
which science instruction is providing the right answer. In this specific case,
instruction has not helped the student articulate theological and biological cate
gories in such a way that both become meaningful for the student
Like the student above, the student who responds, "organisms eat
other organisms to preserve their species" is showing an interest in theological
or philosophical categories. It may be that unlike the first student, the second
student knows that citing God as a causal agent is inappropriate in a science
classroom. Nevertheless, lacking sufficient articulation between theological
and biological categories, the student gives a meaningful, teieologicai response,
not a biological one. On the other hand, there may be a nontheistic
phdosophical basis for this response. Further investigation would be required
to make a determination. What we can conclude is that, our students may
well learn from classroom instruction that big fish eat litde fish, but their own
world views provide the explanation. This example illustrates the immense
difference between understanding and explanation (Strike, 1972). Furthermore,
this example is particularly instructive because it implies religious factors,
about which science educators are rightfully cautious. The argument from
world view does not imply that religious teaching should be introduced in the
science classroom. What it argues is that educators' sensitivities
notwithstanding, factors such as religion are important aspects of student world
views (and for that matter, of teacher world views as well). One cannot
ignore these factors and expect that it wdl make no difference.
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Figure #14 summarizes the root analysis of an alleged misconception.
The term misconception as it is currendy used fails to distinguish between two
distinct categories. The first category is the relatively simple case of
uninformed naivete, inadequate instruction or misinformation that leads to
factual misunderstanding. This is the category of true misconception. The
student's world view is not the issue, and this is the general assumption in
current misconception research. However, world view theory points to a
second and much larger category. The alleged misconception can be an
explanation logically deduced from a distincdy different world view. Because
this conception or belief has intuitive appeal for the student, assimdation of
what is considered proper scientific understanding is hindered. Or, a student
may have an alternative world view which in principle is capable of assimdat-
ing scientific understanding, but does not esteem scientific explanations of
physical reality. Thus, the student does not retain them. Third, though a
student's alternative world view might not actively hinder science understand
ing or interest, meaningful learning requires that the science concepts be linked
to the student's world view. The fadure to establish such links results in the
rejection or non-retention of the science concept. In the second category, the
student's ideas are not properly called misconceptions, for they are logically
grounded in the student's view of nature. They are alternative conceptions,
only some of which are also science misconceptions. One is more correct in
referring to them as commonsense ideas or untutored beliefs. In the research
literature there are many descriptions of student ideas about physical
phenomena. Especially good sources are Driver (1983), Driver et al. (1985),
Helm & Novak (1983), and Novak (1987). The events described in these
sources are more than mere misconception. To say in what manner these
events are related to student world views would require a significant research
undertaking. The relationship to world view is not somediing immediately
apparent
The implications of world view for instruction are significant. Novak
(1977, pp.25&26) stated that "meaningful learning occurs when new
information is linked with existing concepts" in the learner's cognitive
structure. Advance organizers are intended to provide such links. However,
the typical advance organizer is a product of a mechanical view of causality
and a naturalistic view of the world, and thus would be of limited value for
the above students. To be effective, an advance organizer must link
instruction with appropriate presuppositions within a student's world view. In
the above example the teacher would have to introduce a greater range of
classifications, discuss their relations, and the reasons for limiting them in the
science classroom. In this example, the suggestion is that science learning as
structured by the teacher was hindered because the student found the scientific
view unconvincing vis-a-vis his or her personal view. There is no indication,
however, that the student's personal view is inherendy incompatible with
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STUDENTS WORLD VIEW
Fig. 14. Root analysis of an Alleged Misconception
science, Thus, the proper instmctional goal is not to substitute classifications,
but to enrich the student's world view by developing or refining world view
classifications.
The above scenario will have to be justified by research. It does
have much that is appealing. From world view theory one can infer testable
explanations for the answers given by students. One can infer explanations for
the ineffectiveness of typical, science instmctional strategies. Finally, one can
infer that while dissonance strategies do not effectively cope with critical
barrier phenomena, strategies that attempt to build deep cognitive bridges
reaching back to the students' world view presuppositions will be instruction-
ally more effective. In sum, there is in world view theory significant,
potential explanatory power for misconception research generated data.
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Validity of the Logico-Structural Model
for Science Education Research
It has not been the purpose for this monograph to provide empirical
evidence for Kearney's world view model. As stated in Chapter 1, the
presentation of logico-structuralism and the marshalling of empirical evidence
was the purpose of Kearney's 1984 publication. To this one may add that
there is great, commonsense appeal for the six universal categories, Self,
NonSelf, Classification, Relationship, Causahty, Time, and Space. Could
anyone function without such categories? And if world view is what the
anthropologists say it is, then the contents of these categories must have some
influence on students' behavior in the science classroom. But is this influence
of any significance in science education? And if it is, what is the nature and
magnitude of this influence?
The significance of world view is inferentially supported by the con
structivist epistemology of Novak (1982) and Gowin (1981). Ault et al. wrote:
several directions in recent science education research point
to the importance of understanding the organization of content
in cognitive structure...Novak (1982) interprets research over
the past several years at Cornell...to favor the view that
assimilation of new knowledge is most closely related to the
development of cognitive structure...(1984, p.443)
World view is the foundation for cognitive structure as indicated by the
position given to world view in Figure #3 (Chapter 2, p..X).5 Therefore by
extrapolation, the evidence noted by Ault et al. for the importance of cognitive
structure in learning can be applied to world view. Though this evidence for
the significance of world view in science education is clearly circumstantial,
it is nonetheless compelling.
Further research on the significance of world view must include
investigations of die nature and magnitude of world view influence in science
education. However, researchers wdl pursue these issues only if convinced of
the validity of a theory such as logico-structuralism. This validity rests on a
theory's power to reinterpret existing research data so that greater, more pro
found insight into the phenomena is gained. The previous five chapters were
intended to support logico-structuralism as just such a theory. The specific
arguments were first that one gains insight into student understanding of the
world by using a logico-structural world view research approach, vis-a-vis
'Also see Figure #1, page 442, in Ault et al. (1984).
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misconception, conceptual change, and thematic world view approaches, among
others. Second, logico-structuralism is a powerful generator of significant, new
avenues of research and methods of research. World view theory must be
capable of generating a significant research agenda.
A Research Agenda
The annual end-of-year reviews of science education research (e.g.,
Koballa et al., 1990) consistendy show science educators to be interested in
three broad, student oriented, research areas. There is the multifarious
research aimed at the direct measurement of student achievement in science,
including studies of student conceptions and student attitudes toward science.
This research at times involves specific instmctional interventions (e.g., Baker,
1988). At other times it stands alone (e.g., Abbott & Lisa-Johnson, 1988).
Another major research area is the neo-Piagetian study of student cognitive
development, including the development of critical thinking, as it pertains to
science education (e.g., Shernesh & Lazarowitz, 1988). And tiien there are
studies of student background factors vis-a-vis science achievement and
attitudes (e.g., Haukoos & Chandayat, 1988). These studies primarily employ
correlational and survey techniques (e.g., Matsui, 1989).
In addition, there are two fledgling, frequendy related areas of
research. The use of qualitative research methods marks one of these areas
(e.g., Tobin et al., 1990). This research is often guided by the methodological
work of Erickson (1986) and Spradley (1979). The other area is comprised
of research that focuses on the importance of understanding student ideas and
beliefs. In this area Driver's (1983) work is foundational. Qtiier important
contributors are Solomon (1989) and Sutton (1989), for example.6 Bloom's
context of meaning research is also included. It is these latter two research
areas along with research in cultural anthropology that form the backdrop for
the social study of science education in general (e.g., Millar, 1989), and world
view research specifically. As will be discussed in the next section, world
view research can only be pursued qualitatively. And of course, world view
research is inherendy about ideas and beliefs, whether ideas and beliefs
belonging to students or teachers. The distinctions to bear in mind are that
world view research concerns fundamental categories antecedent to knowledge
as it is typically studied by science education researchers, and is about
knowledge in cultural context.
•The prominent contributors to this research tend to be included in or associated with the
Alternative Conception MovemenL See for example, Osborne & Freyberg (1985) and Bell (1981).
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With this background, one may proceed to consider the investigations
suggested by logico-structural, world view theory and the seven critical
questions discussed in Chapter 5. What follows is a brief description of six
research avenues. The order is intentional. It seems logical that investigations
of student world views, teacher world views, and the cultuial study of science
and scientists can mn concurrendy, and are prerequisite to the study of world
view sensitive instructional procedures, the study of affect, and developmental
studies. These six avenues are offered in addition to the several specific
studies implied in previous chapters (particularly Chapter 4).
Student World Views: The first research avenue is based on the following
critical questions taken from Chapter 5, pages 77 and 83.
What contexts do students bring to die
classroom, and how do these interact with
the teacher's context?
Can scientifically neutral presuppositions
and attributes within student world views be
identified?
What are the student presuppositions and
attributes that actively hinder scientific
understanding and science attitudes?
The aim of this research avenue is to understand the world views of students.
Here student refers to adolescents and adults who may be assumed to have
well developed world views, rather than children whose world views are in
formative stages. Development issues are not unimportant, but as discussed
in Chapter 2, it is questionable that world view formation can be isolated
from other aspects of cognitive development in formative stages. There is
thus reason to treat cognitive development more holistically as done in context
of meaning research (Bloom, In Press). With respect to older students, the
logico-structural model provides the researcher with seven basic directions, and
many interactions among these basic directions, to follow. Ultimately one
would hope to be able to describe the presuppositional contours of student
world views, based on the logico-structural model.
Understanding the contour of student world views, however, is only
the first half of understanding student world views. The second half is placing
those world views in cultural context. It bears repeating. American society
is a pluralistic society. Its subcultures are defined by language, ethnicity,
economic status, gender, and religion. If world view research is to meet its
full potential, educators must come to understand how experiences associated
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with membership in a cultural subgroup influence and support student world
views. For many researchers, the greatest attractiveness of world view
research will be the opportunity to bring greater ethnic, gender, and/or
religious sensitivity to the classroom.
One approach that researchers might take in the analysis of student
world views, based on the mixture of student conceptions shown in Figure
#14. This approach involves sorting out true science misconceptions of
students from commonsense beliefs, and then attempting to describe world
view differences between those students who prefer their own commonsense
beliefs and those"" that more readdy adopt formal scientific understanding.
Bearing in mind the Driver et al. (1985) finding that students often do not
employ scientific criteria for coherence of ideas, one would seek to understand
the role that commonsense ideas play in an individual's ordinary life. In
other words, if students do not require a scientific sense of coherence and
unity, what is it that makes a commonsense belief commonsense? This
question brings the researcher to the issue of context. What is the life a
student like and how do life events influence his or her thinking?
The weakness of this approach is that it wdl not likely yield a broad
picture of student world views. It is likely to yield but a snapshot of the
presuppositions the researcher believes to be related to the science conception
under study. For example, if a researcher studies student views concerning
force, the researcher will first have to fight the tendency to study the student
views in relation to scientific conceptions. Instead, the proper objective is to
understand student views of force as they relate to students' culturally based,
general understanding of how the world works. Even then, a persistent focus
on force alone obscures the context in which student ideas about force are
held.
The broader, context sensitive picture comes by focusing first on two
or three world view categories and their interrelationships (e.g., Cobern et al.,
1990). From this point, two corollary research avenues emerge. One avenue
is the second half of student world view research mentioned above, i.e.,
placing those world views in cultural context. The second avenue involves
the examination of how student culture interacts with the culture of science as
presented in the classroom. What one anticipates is that understanding how
the science classroom culture interacts with the cultures of students will enable
researchers to better understand conceptual change and attitude development.
An area of research related to the analysis of student world views is
the area of cross-cultural and international research. Although cross-cultural
research can degenerate into odious comparisons providing bragging rights for
the groups that come out on top and poUtical leverage for the also rans, it
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also can stimulate informative discussions on the role of culture in education.
It has been argued that science education is culturally determined, something
difficult to see clearly from within a culture. In principal, international studies
involving nations with distinctiy different national cultures, such as an African
nation and a Western nation, can shed light on the cultural artifacts in the two
national science education programs. Furthermore, what the African researcher
Hewson has said about science, can be applied to science education:
rather than continuing to encourage the West to donate
scientific knowledge and skills to developing countries, a
different approach might usefully be taken. Critical dialogue
between the West and the developing countries could promote
conceptual change of the knowledge bases of both, and allow
for the emergence of a new type of science that is effective
in meeting specific problems at a range of levels in
developing countries, and possibly in the West as well. (1988,
P.317)
The type of comparative cultural study envisioned here involves a dialogue
about student world views in two cultures and how those cultures attempt to
teach science. Again, the purpose is to Uluminate cultural artifacts in
education that may or may not be necessary, artifacts that may indeed be
damaging. Additionally, this type of research reflects a critical reality.
Science and technology transcend national boundaries, and thus neither these
nor science education are uniquely Western phenomena any more.
The Culture of Science: The second major research avenue is the cultural
analysis of science for the purpose of answering the following critical question
(taken from Chapter 5, page 75).
Given the considerable variation among
scientists due to the many cultures in which
they live, what are the essential presuppo
sitions and attributes of a scientifically com
patible world view?
It was noted earlier that Robinson (1968), Martin (1972), and Duschl (1990)
are foundational in science education. These texts provide the internal
perspective on science in reference to science education. The culture of
science, however, includes an external perspective. Take for example, Fernand
Hallyn's (1990) reconsideration of Copernicus, Kepler, and heliocentrism.
Instead of a decontextuahzed account of an historical event in science, Hallyn
places heliocentrism in the fabric of 16th Century European culture. As
summarized by his translator:
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Hallyn contends that during this period closely related notions
of harmony, symmetry and proportion informed cosmology,
music theory and the representation of the human body.
(Hallyn, 1990)
Hallyn uses Charles Sanders Pierce's concept of abduction, commenting that:
It is true that factual connections sometimes furnish at least
explanations for the appearance of a new hypothesis: the
observation of new phenomena, the development of new
techniques ... But generally speaking, the establishment of a
new hypothesis remains an enigmatic moment (1990,
pp.7&8)
Standard accounts in the history of science speak to the factual connections.
But it is in culture that one begins to understand the enigmatic. John Greene
takes a simdar approach to the historical study of evolution (1961 & 81), in
stark contrast to Mayr's account in The Growth of Biological Thought (1982).7
It is thus fair to ask how closely the image of science and scientists
presented in science education fits with the actuality of science and scientists.
One may find that at times educators repeat the proof-texting error of logical
positivists, that is, the error of constructing a rational view of science and only
then looking at actual science for examples to prove their case. Later
phdosophers and historians examined actual historical science and actual
current laboratory practices and came away with a much different view of
scientists and the scientific endeavor (e.g., Spiegel-Rosing & Price, 1977).
This type of research spawned the social study of science which is both the
study of the social interactions among scientists, and the study of science in
its economic, political, and general cultural contexts." Researchers in this field
have taken great interest in what scientific publications do not say, i.e.,
what is shared with their audience and does not need saying,
or what is simply not asked by the audience, is also relevant
^or other research examples that examine, in varying degrees, the external, social history of
science, see Thomas' Man and the Natural World (1984); Merchant's The Death of
Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (1983); and Mathias' Science
and Society, 1600-1900 (1972).
*This is a relatively recent field which came into iu own with the first meeting of the Society
for Social Studies of Science in 1976. One of the classic texts in this field is Robert Merlon's
"Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England" (1938). For an excellent
introduction to the social study of science see Barnes & Edge (1982).
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to interpreting them, and we have no assurances that when
they were silent they might not also be presupposing things
we do not share with them (Turner 1989, p.371).
As a result of the research in this field many of the unfortunate myths con
cerning science and scientists, such as the positivist iceman image of scientists
involved in a totally objective endeavor, have been debunked. Stephen Bmsh
(1974) has already remarked, tongue in cheek, that where students are
concerned educators may wish to give the history of science an X rating; and
so it may be with the social study of science. The point is that by exami
ning the research in the social study of science educators can develop a better
understanding of the world view variations among scientists and what it means
to have a scientifically compatible world view. To name only a few, there are
successful scientists among the ranks of women, African-Americans, Christians,
and non-westerners as well as from white, male Americans. What do these
people have in common that allows them to value and successfully participate
in the scientific enterprize? That should be the understanding that informs
classroom practice. And it bears repeating, the goal is not to identify the
definitive scientific world view, but to determine the necessary and sufficient
aspects of a scientifically compatible world view.
Teacher World Views: Associated with the above avenues of research is the
social study of science teaching, something that M.F.D. Young advocated in
1974. Given the teacher's central role in the classroom, it is reasonable to
form the initial hypothesis that classroom culture is primarily a function of
teacher world view. Thus, the critical questions are (see Chapter 5, pages
82&83):
To what extent is the teacher aware of the
context of science being promulgated in his
or her classroom?
What is the teacher's context, i.e., the
beliefs and presuppositions?
To what extent is this context essential for
science?
As discussed in Chapter 5, teachers do not teach science, pure and simple.
Teachers bring a context to the classroom and they teach from that context.
Science teachers do not come to the classroom with a universal, generic
scientific world view. The cultural analysis of science and defining the
parameters of a scientifically compatible world view, as mentioned above, will
inevitably involve researchers in the problem of distinguishing between lived
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and articulated world views. Given a decent education in science, there is
every reason to believe that teachers will come to the classroom with logico-
structurally related presuppositions and attributes of importance to science.
These will not be hermetically sealed off from the teacher's total world view,
but will be an integrated part of his or her world view. These will not be
decontextuahzed in the classroom. For example, a teacher may foster in the
classroom a view of the world that allows the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
to be meaningful for students. That same teacher's articulated view of science
may include an extrapolation from the physical phenomenon of sub-atomic
uncertainty to phdosophical and ideological uncertainty. This articulated view
of science is by no means essential to science, and yet because it is important
to the teacher it becomes part of what is presented in the classroom as the
scientific world view. This may occur exphcidy or in the hidden curriculum.
As stated before, one must be concerned about the inaccurate portrayal of
science in education (Gauld, 1987). One must also be concemed about
potential mismatches between teacher and student points of view. According
to Yager & Kahle (1982):
Only a few studies have explored how the characteristics of
teachers and of students mix to produce various classroom
climates and also how these climates influence the learning
and attitudes of diverse students, (p.526, emphasis added)
A vital item then on any world view research agenda must be classroom
culture, or climate as in the above quote. This specifically means the
clarification of how teachers articulate a view of science within their own
world views, the effect of teacher world view on curricular decisions, and the
impact of teacher world views on students.
The next three research avenues are in varying degrees dependent
upon the findings of the above research avenues. The critical questions
involved in these avenues are the questions of student world views and
classroom interaction.
Research on Instruction: The fourth avenue of world view research speaks
to activities in the science classroom. Already some writers have implied that
science education should be used to influence students' world views (e.g.,
Proper, Wideen & Ivany, 1988). The theory of world view implies that in the
short time span of a typical classroom setting attempts at influencing student
world views are not likely to be successful. Indeed, evidence exists that the
classroom setting does not appreciably influence student views on the nature
of science (e.g., see Lederman, 1986; Lederman & Zeidler, 1986), which
should be an easier task than influencing world view. What can reasonably
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be predicted is that influence will only be achieved over a long period of
time; and that influence aimed at enhancing or further articulating students'
world views is more likely to be successful than attempts at overt change.
There is, however, a more practical and ultimately more important
issue. Is it possible, and if so is it feasible, to develop effective world
view-informed, instmctional strategies and materials? In other words, one is
asking how knowledge of student world views can be used to help teachers
provide more effective classroom instruction. In this research the investigator
is trying to develop instmctional strategies that are both compatible with the
cultures of students, and effective in meeting society's goals for science
education. As mentioned previously, some type of secondculture approach has
significant appeal.
Emotion and Affect: The fifth avenue of research involves a relatively
underdeveloped area in science education research, i.e., the role of affect or
emotion in science learning and attitude development Unfortunately the
distinction between rational and irrational aspects of learning is not clear (West
& Pines, 1983; Strike & Posner, 1983). Nevertheless, Novak has written
recendy that an,
emerging trend in the psychology of learning is greater
emphasis on the role of feelings or emotion in learning, and
the interplay between an individual's self-concept and choice
of learning strategies and/or domains of science. (1989)
Bloom (In Press) concurs. He asserts that emotion is an aspect of context of
meaning. A researcher wishing to approach the issue of affect from a world
view perspective would be well advised to focus attention on the Self-
Relationship-NonSelf structure. As noted earlier, the West has traditionally
separated nature and the individual. Gillispie (1960) argued that Galileo
further divided the two by distinguishing size, figure, number, and motion as
objective, primary qualities, while reducing color and taste, for example, to the
status of subjective, secondary qualities. It was also mentioned earlier, that
there is evidence that this is a peculiarly masculine, Western point of view.
Logico-structural informed research would investigate the presuppositions of
Self, about nature, and about people's relationship with nature in an effort to
understand the epistemological foundation for emotions related to science
achievement and attitude.
Developmental Research: The final research avenue to be discussed here,
though one would hope that other researchers wdl add to this world view
agenda, involves the question of development It has been argued by Novak
(1982) that the data resulting from a Piagetian research paradigm can better be
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explained by the constructivist epistemological paradigms of theorists such as
David Ausubel. That may well be the case, but it is also possible that some
Piagetian research may profitably be redirected by a world view theory such
as logico-structuralism. Susan Buck-Morss noted that while Piaget rejected
ideologies of biological racism, a universal application of Piaget's devel
opmental theory,
cannot account for the frequent chronological 'lag' in test
performance of non-Western samples and the fact that
members, of some cultures never 'reach' certain levels of
logical operations. (1975, p.261)
Thus, there is a subde, racist implication. Perhaps placing developmental
theory within the framework of world view theory would circumvent this
difficulty.
The Methodology of World View Research
Preliminary Issues: Research methodology is a cmcial issue, and it is
essential to remind oneself that methodology must proceed from a clear
understanding of the research questions. A world view investigator might
study student concepts of animal, not vis-a-vis animal as a science concept, but
as a concept in cultural context. The researcher chooses a topic such as
animal because it is a topic of importance in science education; and, in
principal, understanding cultural context wdl work to improve science
education. At the risk of overstatement, bear in mind that the distinctiveness
of world view research concerns fundamental categories antecedent to
knowledge as it is typically studied by science education researchers, and is
about knowledge in cultural context.
Having been reminded of the research focus, one must consider the
problems involved with presupposition recognition. How do you know one
when you see one? If a presupposition is a variety of belief, how can the two
be distinguished? As mentioned at the end of Chapter 3, perhaps the best
guide was provided by Jones (1972, p.83). He suggested that there are five
distinctions between world view presuppositions and ordinary belief. These
are paraphrased below using the terminology of this monograph rather than
Jones'.
1. The uses one has for particular beliefs tends
to be obvious, while the uses for presuppo
sitions are much more subde.
2. Generally, beliefs are easdy verbalized by
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an individual. Presuppositions are very
difficult to verbalize and impossible when
subconscious. An objective in world view
research is to verbalize infrequendy verba
lized presuppositions.
3. Beliefs can be taught with relative ease and
often are taught through formal instruction.
Presuppositions are learned informally over
a much larger span of time.
4. Presuppositions are both resdient and
tenacious. They flex, but do not easily
change fundamentally. Behefs are much
more readily modified or changed.
5. Beliefs tend to be about specifics and are
invoked only on specific, relevant occasions.
The influence of presuppositions is contin
uous, but very subde.
While helpful, it is obvious that these distinctions are not going to be clear in
every case. It is important not to get bogged down in semantic hair-splitting.
One should apply these distinctions for getting at fundamental levels of belief,
recognizing that distinguishing among those presuppositions and beliefs that
hover about an interface is probably not all that important
The Collection of Data: Perhaps the best place for anyone to begin a search
for world view research methodology is with the literature of cultural
anthropology.9 What one finds is that the research is ethnographic, in that it
focuses on people in their life-settings, their culture, what they do and believe,
and why they do and believe those things. The research of cultural
anthropology is also found to be qualitative in that it focuses on what hfe
events are like and the context of those events, rather than on quantitative
measures of those events.10 The distinctiveness of qualitative methodology is
its contextual sensitivity. According to Smith (1987):
•For different examples see Farris & Glerm (1976); Agar (1980); Hvitfeldt (1986). Also see
classic ethnographies, such as Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Chagnon (1968).
*For an argument, similarly basedon worldview theory, for the use of qualitative methods
in science education research, see Roberts (1982).
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Qualitative researchers reject the notion of universal, context-
free generalizations. Learning to solve word problems in
arithmetic, for example, is not something that occurs in
isolated, antiseptic, laboratory-like settings; rather, it takes
place in contexts of human and institutional purposes, prior
learning and teaching, and the presence of others; it is
facditated or inhibited by material and physical resources; it
involves personal and interpersonal histories, and the like.
(P-175)
In recent years qualitative research has gained popularity in the general field
of education (e.g., Erickson, 1986), as well as in the specific field of science
education (e.g., Tobin et al., 1990). Smith (1987) pointed out that there is
considerable disagreement among researchers as to what properly constitutes
qualitative research. Some researchers hold to quite exclusive definitions.
However, Smith persuasively argued that there are at least four distinct,
research approaches that can properly be called qualitative. The approach
most commonly employed in science education research is an interpretive
approach. There are also artistic approaches, systematic approachers, and
theory-driven approaches. Given its origin in anthropology and the fact that
it is inherendy a totality concept, it is reasonable to assume world view
investigations wiU be done qualitatively, after one fashion or another.
Having raised the subject of qualitative research, the subordinant issue
of etic and emic approaches, terms originated by the missionary and linguistic
theoretician Kenneth Pike (1954), must also be discussed. Boas exemplifies
the emic tradition:
If it is our serious purpose to understand the thoughts of a
people the whole analysis of experience must be based on
their concepts, not ours. (1943, p.314)
On the other hand:
Eticists believe that the conceptual categories of cultural
reality must be determined by the researchers, based on their
identification of the causes of cultural phenomena.
(Shimahara, 1988, p.81)
In both education and cultural anthropology it is the emic perspective that
researchers most frequendy take. There are however, categories that one
knows to be of interest in a broad range of socio-cultural settings. The
famdy, for example. Regardless of cultural group, an anthropologist wdl want
to know how families are defined, organized, and they functions. Family is
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an etic category, even though the researcher will seek data on the family from
an emic perspective. In a similar fashion, logico-stmcturalism provides a set
of etic categories of interest over many settings. However, the researcher will
no doubt pursue emic perspectives on Self, NonSelf, Causation, etc. The point
is for the researcher to avoid a contrived either/or situation with regard to etic
and emic perspectives. The concepts are most profitably use when used as
complements.
World view research makes use of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss,
1967). Essentially, investigators read back (Jones, 1961) from naturalistic
observational data or interview data to explanatory or descriptive categories.
This task can be facilitated by constructing Vee maps (Ault et al., 1984),
where palcement on the Vee is detemiined by fit of data with die distinctions
of presuppositions listed earlier. The categones inferred from the qualitative
data are hypotheses. According to Hutchinson (1988):
The task is to discover and conceptualize the essence of
specific interactional processes. The resulting [grounded]
theory provides a new way of understanding the social situa
tions from which the theory was generated, (p. 124)
In world view research the inferred hypotheses are possible world view
presuppositions. One would expect predictions to be deduced from the
hypothesized presuppositions and subsequently tested by further observations.
Inferences must find warrant in the source of the data and method of data
collection (Lythcott & Duschl, 1990). Validity will mainly be conceded based
on the cogency with which warrant is argued in pubhshed presentations of the
research.
As to specific methods, there are no world view research manuals,
this monograph cannot change that, but can offer examples of important ideas
and hterature. Smith's comment about qualitative methods fits what one finds
in the hterature of cultural anthropology with respect to world view:
methods are used inventively and tadored to the situation. In
many cases, multiple methods are employed, and the findings
of alternative methods are played off against each other.
(1987, p. 175)
One is likely to use interview methods currenUy employed in the study of
student thinking. For example, the Osborne & Freyberg (1985) Interview -
About-Instances (IAi) technique can be adapted for world view research.
Consider a current investigation on gender differences with respect to
fundamental views of the natural world (Cobern et al., 1990). This research
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with college students, which asks about presuppositions in a particular domain
of the NonSelf, began with the collection of free expository responses to a
question about nature. The researchers examined the data for categories that
might be used to organize the data. Following Jones' (1972) suggestion that
categories be dichotomous, they found the data to support four categories:
Aesthetic/Materialistic
Sacred/Profane
Conservative/Exploitive
Chaotic/Orderly
In subsequent research an IAI interview technique was adapted to include
these categories. The IAI instances became a set of photographs depicting
scenes from the natural world. College students were asked to respond to
these photographs by offering unrestricted comments, and by responding to
statements about the photographs, where the statements were derived from die
above categories. From the interview data the researchers wdl attempt to draw
inferences concerning the students fundamental views about the natural world
(Cobern, 1990).
As another example consider a preliminary study based on the
deduction that world view variation implies diat different types of causal
explanation wdl be unequally acceptable among different students, i.e., that
students will have differing composites of causal presuppositions (Cobern,
1989). This study involved the development of an instrument for detecting the
hypothesized world view variations in the Causal universal. The instrument,
referred to as the Test of Preferred Explanations (TOPE), is a paper-and-pen
instrument largely comprised of fictional episodes each followed by two
explanations of different type (see Figure #15). The explanations were classed
either as more scientifically compatible or less scientifically compatible, where
scientific compatibdity was determined by philosophic analysis. The strategy
in this investigation was to read back from the TOPE scores to possible causal
presuppositions. Although this work is still in progress the early indication is
that first year college students bring to class a variety of views widi regard to
what constitutes a compelling explanation, and that this variation may well
be an important factor in science education. However, this study suffered
from methodological flaws, and furthermore, the researchers quickly learned
that the paper-and-pen format obscured significant contextual information. It
is mentioned here because the idea of using fictitious scenarios, including
events and various types of explanations, has considerable potential for use in
IAI interviews. In addition to data on what types of explanations students
prefer, interviews would provide a wealth of data concerning student
understanding of explanations, and the reasons they employ in arriving at a
preference.
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Just as Smith (1987) has commented about qualitative research in
general, world view research requires innovative techniques such as the ficti
tious episodes used in the research described above, as well as other methods
found in the hterature of anthropology. In addition to these sources there are
research methods in the education literature that can be adapted for world view
Senario
Occasionally when entering a room for the first time
one gets the distinct impression that he has been there
before. This impression can be very strong and
disturbing, and all the more because one is sure that
he has not ever seen the room before. There seems
to be two reasonable explanations for this phenomenon:
This is an example of deja vu which is something almost all of us
experience from time to time. It is remembering a place you had never been
to before or an object or person you have never seen before. This
phenomenon is a reminder of the vast complexity of the human mind, a
complexity of which we understand very little. What we understand least
is the capacity of the mind to perceive things outside the range of our basic
physical senses.
B.
The human brain is a complex electro-chemical computer. Although for the
most part it functions faultlessly there are occasional lapses. The above is
such a case. After the first glimpse of the room there is an instantaneous
functional lapse and recovery. The lapse causes the initial glimpse to be
separated from the current perception of the room. The result is that the
initial glimpse becomes like a memory. One is deceived into thinking that
he has seen the room before.
Fig. 15. Scenario with Fictitious Explanations
use. The Dart and Pradham mapping technique has potential for use in
studying presuppositions in the Space universal of students. As mentioned in
Chapter 4, these researchers, interested in readiness to understand and use
scientific abstractions, compared maps showing home and school drawn by
American and Nepalese students (Dart and Pradham, 1967; Dart, 1971; also
see McCormack, 1988). Another technique with potential for wider use has
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students respond to illustrations. Osborne and Gilbert (1980) used this method
to explore students basic understanding of force. A good source of potential
techniques can be found in White (1979) which describes various methods for
exploring students' cognitive structures. Also, see Millar (1989).
The above examples pertain primarily to research with students,
though some of the techniques could be adapted for use with teachers.
Techniques such as IAI interviews are recommended because the recording of
data on students in naturalistic settings, such as a classroom, is unlikely to
provide sufficient data on which to base inferences about student
presuppositions in several categories. Teachers, however, occupy a much
more observable position in the classroom via lectures, interpersonal
communications with students, choices of content and activities. Thus, world
view research pertaining to teachers can make significant use of techniques
such as classroom videotaping. In earlier comments on the Dagher &
Cossman (1990) study, it was however, pointed out that teacher interviews
must accompany classroom observation if one is to obtain an understanding of
the contexts teachers bring to the classroom. This context is the essential
second half of world view research.
Until the previous sentence, the focus thus far has been the first half
of world view research, i.e., investigating what people believe about the world.
Context is the second, but no lesser, half as mentioned in Chapter 2.
Contextual research, however, requires a caveat emptor or two. Gender,
religious, ethnicity factors among students wdl draw contextual research. The
existence of such factors does not support an ideology of cultural pluralism
that asserts a distinct, homogenous world view for each group. One should
expect significant intra-subculture variations. Secondly, the understanding of
context will not lead to any kind of one-to-one correspondence between
cultural factors and beliefs about the world. Cultural understanding provides
general understanding of an individual's thoughts and actions.
To do context research is really to do biography (e.g., Campbell,
1988; Goodson & Walker, 1988). Factual data can be obtained from school
records or surveys. But to build a picture of a student's or teacher's culture
requires interviewing where a person (or possibly a small group) has the
chance to freely talk about: his or her family and friends, where the person
lives, what is watched on television, what is talked about in casual
conversation, what her or she thinks about school, and many other questions.
By itself, this would be time consuming research. Coupled with the first half
of world view research, the total time required is extensive. If the subject is
student world view, the time required increases to the point that a serious
problem is posed for most researchers. One way of handling this is to involve
teachers as cooperating researchers (see e.g., Tobin et al., 1989). On a day
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to day basis, teachers have far more access to students for interviews than do
university researchers. Many teachers also enjoy a rapport with their studenLs
that would greatiy facditate the task of obtaining life-history data.
Furthermore, with proper training there are no methodological reasons for not
having teachers participate as research interviewers and interpreters.
In concluding, it is important to note that quahtative, interview
methodology is not without its difficulties; and experienced researchers who
write about qualitative methodology should not be ignored. Smith (1987)
offers several points on what good quahtative research must include. Lythcott
& Duschl (1990) point out the centrality of warrant, an issue overlooked in
some research. Bell et al. (1985) offers guidelines for conducting interviews.
These are experience based guidelines intended to help other researchers avoid
methodological errors. The anthropologist Paul Roth has recendy written on
Ethnography without Tears (1989), in which he speaks to Clifford Geertz'
comment, "we have met the unreliable narrator...and he is us" (quoted in Roth,
1989, p.555). Roth's article is followed by a series of editorial comments
from distinguished anthropologists. The article and comments together provide
an informative discussion on issues surrounding the collection, interpretation,
and public presentation of ethnographic data.
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Concluding Remarks
But what is meant by the word explain! We accept some
thing as an explanation when it shows how an unexplained
fact fits into the world as we already understand it.
Explanation is related to the framework of understanding we
inhabit, the firm structure of beliefs we never question, our
picture of how things really are. Explanation puts a strange
thing into a place where it fits and is no longer strange.
(Newbigin, 1986, p.22)
People live in a rich experiential world brought to them by their
senses. But the data of one's senses is an amorphous mass of confusion until
interpreted by one's world view. Peter Berger argued in his book The
Heretical Imperative (1979) that with one exception a people's world view
provides a special plausibility structure of ideas, activities and values which
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allows one to gauge the plausibility of any belief or assertion.1 For example
in a Muslim nation such as Iran the notion of state/religion separation is quite
strange because it conflicts with the plausibdity structure of an Islamic world
view. Berger further stated that the original notion of a heretic was someone
who decided things for himself or herself instead of employing society's
plausibility structure. Societies around the globe have these plausibility
structures, and in past times the West also had its plausibdity structures. The
exception today is the modem West According to Berger, the rule of the day
is that everyone decides for him or herself. In other words, Westerners are
all under an heretical imperative.
Perhaps not. The theologian Lesslie Newbigin (1986) whde essen
tially agreeing with Berger's critique of the West, argues diat Western culture
has been so influenced by positivistic notions of science that the Western
plausibility structure has become thefacts (what might also be referred to as
naturalism or secular humanism). A distinctive feature of the modem West
is that Westerners have divided off the public world of facts from the private
world of opinions, beliefs and emotions. Thus, Newbigin argues that
Westerners do decide for themselves, but the decisions in die public world are
based on the facts. It is heretical to do other wise. In the private world,
however, one is without a plausibdity strucuire and thus under Berger's
heretical imperative.
Together, Newbigin and Berger provide an interesting assessment of
Western culture and society. Others are persuaded that there are in fact
several world view variants in Western culture, and thus, several plausibility
structures. There is reason to agree with Newbigin that science has had and
continues to have a powerful influence on the West, and that for many
Westerners the facts indeed do represent a plausibdity structure. For many
others however, plausibility is grounded in theism, monism, perhaps even
nihilism and hedonism. Westerners have significant similarities within their
world views, and most find it appropriate to speak of a Western world view.
Still, there are equally important differences.
One can argue that naturalism is the plausibility structure of science
education. Furthermore, it can reasonably he asserted that educators typically
presume that students in the science classroom also operate within this struc
ture. Unfortunately, American classrooms are filled with heretics operating
within other plausibility structures. They are recognized by their alleged
misconceptions:
'For further study see Berger's The Sacred Canopy (1969) and Sire's The Universe
Next Door (1976).
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Talk of misconceptions...carries widi it die suggestion tliat
something has been botched or bungled, or that something
has gone amiss...And there is often the further implication
that the student is the culprit: that he or she is the one who
has gotten something wrong...There is more to error than
meets the eye. (Hills, 1989, p.174)
Indeed, there is more than meets the eye. A study of world views will reveal
that young children in the classroom are in die process of world view and
plausibility structure formation; and school systems certainly do not provide
the principal, let alone the sole, influence upon this formative process. Older
children, on the other hand, may come to class with well developed world
views. Still, the school was not likely the principal formative agent. There
is, therefore, liule reason to expect that typical science instruction with its
presumed plausibility structure will show "how an unexplained fact fits into
the world as [the students] already understand it (Newbigin, p.22, emphasis
added).
World view theory argues first for an understanding of the world as
students understand it. If successful science instruction for all is an important
American educational goal, ignoring the legitimate variations among people
cannot continue. World view theory argues secondly for the close examination
of the plausibility structure assumed necessary for science and science educa
tion. There is cause for some doubt about this structure given that historically
science has been viewed quite differendy; and because this structure does not
adequately account for die world view variations among scientists and other
educated individuals around the globe today.
Heretofore the researcher in science education has lacked a sufficiently
powerful, theoretical tool for investigating the merit of these arguments. The
value of logico-stmcturahsm is that it provides for this need. The theoretical
composite of Self, NonSelf, Classification, Relationship, Causality, Time and
Space focuses the researcher's attention on the complexity of world view, and
yet the categories themselves provide access to that complexity. And while
the composite nature of the model makes it less likely that the researcher will
oversimplify the notion of world view, one can still speak of world view unity
(e.g., a theistic or naturalistic world view) based on salient presuppositions
within the seven universal categories.
As a beginning several research questions have been posed and a
research agenda suggested. One may be concerned, however, that immersion
in one's own world view blinds a person to both the existence and value of
world view variations among others. For this problem, the research of non-
westerners" who necessarily must deal with science as a second culture can be
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of help. A second concern is that researchers be not dismayed by the
complexity of world view and the early, overly simplistic approaches to world
view study. For this there is help in the literature of cultural anthropology.
Ultimately, however, the value of world view theory as a research framework
in science education rests on its integrating effectiveness and on the
fruitfulness of the research directed by fundamental questions generated by the
theory.
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